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Defining Compensable Injury in
Biomedical research
Megan E. Larkin†
Abstract
Biomedical research provides a core social good by enabling
medical progress. In the twenty-first century alone, this includes
reducing transmission of HIV/AIDS, developing innovative therapies
for cancer patients, and exploring the possibilities of personalized
medicine. In order to continue to advance medical science, research
relies on the voluntary participation of human subjects. Because
research is inherently uncertain, unintended harm is an inevitable
part of the research enterprise. Currently, injured research
participants in the United States must turn to the “litigation lottery”
of the tort system in search of compensation. This state of affairs fails
research participants, who are too often left uncompensated for
devastating losses, and makes the United States an outlier in the
international community. In spite of forty years’ worth of Presidential
Commissions and other respected voices calling for the development of
a no-fault compensation system, no progress has been made to date.
One of the reasons for this lack of progress is the failure to develop a
coherent ethical basis for an obligation to provide compensation for
research related injuries. This problem is exacerbated by the lack of a
clear definition of “compensable injury” in the biomedical research
context.
This article makes a number of important contributions to the
scholarship in this growing field. To begin, it examines compensation
systems already in existence and concludes that there are four main
definitional elements that must be used to define “compensable
injury.” Next, it examines the justifications that have been put forth
as the basis for an ethical obligation to provide compensation, and
settles on retrospective nonmaleficence and distributive and
compensatory justice as the most salient and persuasive. Finally, it
uses the regulatory elements and the justifications discussed in the
first two sections to develop a well-rounded definition of
“compensable injury” that is tailored to the biomedical research
context. Using this definition, it argues for the development of a firstof-its-kind no-fault compensation system in the United States.
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Introduction1
In March of 2006, eight healthy young male volunteers in London
participated in a first-in-human trial of the novel monoclonal
antibody TGN1412.2 Animal studies indicated that TGN1412 was not
likely to have lasting adverse biomedical effects.3 Nonetheless, within
ninety minutes of the drug’s administration, the six volunteers
randomized to the active arm of the trial suffered headaches, nausea,
vomiting, and other symptoms.4 Within twelve hours of the drug’s
administration, all six had suffered multi-organ failure and were in
critical condition for several days.5 Many suffered lasting injuries that
left them unable to work and dependent on medical care.6 The
TGN1412 trial is a vivid example where research risks that seemed
unlikely to occur materialized in a way that severely injured healthy
volunteers.7
In 1993, five participants that had enrolled in U.S. clinical trials
of an experimental Hepatitis B therapy, fialuridine, died as a result of
1.

This research was supported by the Intramural Research Program of the
NIH, and the Warren G. Magnuson Clinical Center. The opinions
expressed here are the views of the author. They do not represent any
position or policy of the National Institutes of Health, the Public Health
Service, or the Department of Health and Human Services. The author
is a U.S. government employee who must comply with the NIH Public
Access Policy, and the author or NIH will deposit, in NIH’s PubMed
Central archive, an electronic version of the final manuscript upon
acceptance for publication, to be made publicly available no later than
12 months after the official date of publication. The author would like
to thank Seema Shah, Alan Wertheimer, Ben Berkman, Leslie Meltzer
Henry, Joe Millum, Kevin Outterson, Francis Miller, and Ron Ghatan
for their thoughtful comments and helpful suggestions on previous
drafts.

2.

Ganesh Suntharalingam et al., Cytokine Storm in a Phase 1 Trial of the
Anti-CD28 Monoclonal Antibody TGN1412, 355 NEJM 1018, 1018
(2006).

3.

See id. at 1027.

4.

Id. at 1018.

5.

Id.

6.

See Michael Seamark, “Elephant Man” Drug Trial Victim Set to Win
£2m Payout for Horrific Injuries, DAILY MAIL, Apr. 29, 2008,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1015349/Elephant-Man-drugtrial-victim-set-win-2m-payout-horrific-injuries.html.

7.

Elisabeth Rosenthal, When Drug Trials Go Horribly Wrong, N.Y. TIMES
Apr. 7, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/07/world/europe/07ihtdrug.html.
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the administration of the study drug.8 Because the subjects in the
TGN1412 were in England, national laws and industry guidelines
ensured that they would receive at least some compensation.9 They
ultimately received more damages by alleging negligence on the part
of the company running the clinical trial.10 The fialuridine trial
subjects and their families, by contrast, were required to turn to the
U.S. tort system “in search of compensation.”11 The Institute of
Medicine published a report on the trial that, in part, recommended
that a no-fault compensation system for research injuries be developed
in the United States.12 To this date no progress has been made.13
Biomedical research provides a core social good that has
dramatically improved the quality of life around the world.14 As one
commentator noted, “[e]xtremely serious and widespread diseases that
plagued prior generations—yellow fever, polio, measles, diphtheria,
and pertussis—have been almost eradicated through vaccines
developed using complex and ground-breaking research.”15 Research
8.

Robin McKenzie et al., Hepatic Failure and Lactic Acidosis Due to
Fialuridine (FIAU), An Investigational Nucleoside Analogue For
Chronic Hepatitis B, 333 NEJM 1099, 1099 (1995).

9.

See Seamark, supra note 6, at 2; Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 3 (noting
that individuals may be eligible for £30,000 to £40,000 or more with
permanent damages under relevant law, but that the sponsor only took
out a £2 million insurance policy on the trial); but see Peter Mansell,
Window is Open for Compensation in TGN1412 Case, CLINICAL NEWS
(Mar.
14,
2007),
http://www.pharmatimes.com/article/07-0314/Window_is_open_for_compensation_in_TGN1412_case.aspx
(stating that each participant had thus far received £10,000, but that
they were hoping to obtain more by proving negligence).

10.

Seamark, supra note 6.

11.

COMM. TO REVIEW THE FIALURIDINE (FIAU/FIAC) CLINICAL TRIALS,
REVIEW OF THE FIALURIDINE (FIAU) CLINICAL TRIALS 96 (Frederick J.
Manning & Morton Swartz eds., 1995) (noting that while almost two
million dollars had been spent on care for trial participants, many
resorted to litigation “in search of compensation.”).

12.

Id.

13.

Leslie Meltzer Henry, Moral Gridlock: Conceptual Barriers to No-Fault
Compensation for Injured Research Subjects, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
411, 420-21 (2013).

14.

U.S. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MED. & BIOMED. & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, COMPENSATING FOR
RESEARCH INJURIES: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF
PROGRAMS TO REDRESS INJURED SUBJECTS 9 [hereinafter U.S
PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS] (1982).
(“The power of medicine to cure and prevent illnesses has increased
enormously during the [twentieth] century. All those having access to
medical care have been the beneficiaries.”).

15.

Elizabeth R. Pike, Recovering from Research: A No-Fault Proposal to
Compensate Injured Research Participants, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 9, 10-11
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also provides an evidence base for public health interventions that
increase life expectancies and reduce morbidity and mortality.16 In the
twenty-first century, research continues to make progress in reducing
transmission of HIV/AIDS,17 developing innovative therapies for
cancer patients,18 and exploring the possibilities of personalized
medicine.19
In order to provide society with the benefits of medical progress,
the biomedical research enterprise relies on the voluntary
participation of research subjects on whom new drugs and
interventions are tested and whose normal biological processes are
also studied.20 Depending on the type of intervention being tested and
the stage of the research, subjects may be either healthy volunteers
from the community or individuals who currently suffer from the
disease or condition that the study intervention is intended to
alleviate. Research inherently exposes these subjects to risks—both
known and unknown—associated with the study intervention,
randomization, or research procedures.21 Unintended harm is,
(2012); see also U.S PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N
PROBLEMS, supra note 14, at 9.

FOR THE

STUDY

OF

ETHICAL

16.

See, e.g., U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL
ISSUES, MORAL SCIENCE: PROTECTING PARTICIPANTS IN HUMAN SUBJECTS
RESEARCH
2
(Dec.
2011),
available
at
http://bioethics.gov/sites/default/files/Moral%20Science%20June%2020
12.pdf.

17.

See Myron S. Cohen et al., Prevention of HIV-1 Infection with Early
Antiretroviral Therapy, 365 NEJM 493, 493 (2011).

18.

See, e.g., Cancer Trends Progress Report – 2011-2012 Update, NAT’L
CANCER
INST.
1,
http://progressreport.cancer.gov/doc.asp?pid=1&did=2011&mid=vcol&
chid=104 (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).

19.

Margaret A. Hamburg & Francis S. Collins, The Path to Personalized
Medicine, 363 NEJM 301 (2010).

20.

U.S PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N
supra note 14, at 12-13.

21.

See id.; see also U.S PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF
BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 16, at 58. This is not intended to be an
exhaustive list of possible sources of harm, but merely an illustration of
some of the more common causes of harm. See, e.g., Annette Rid &
David Wendler, A Framework for Risk-Benefit Evaluations in
Biomedical Research, 21 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 141, 145-56 (2011)
(setting forth a proposed framework for the analysis of research risks). It
is not necessary at this point to distinguish between studies that pose a
net risk to participants (where there is no prospect of direct benefit) and
those where there is a prospect of direct medical benefit because the
subject’s motivation for participation does not affect the societal or
scientific benefit that the research produces. Nor does it relieve
researchers, sponsors, or institutions of their duty to minimize risks. See,
e.g., Steven Joffe & Franklin Miller, Bench to Bedside: Mapping the
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therefore, an inevitable part of the research enterprise.22 While rare,23
tragedies like the death in 1999 of eighteen-year-old Jesse Gelsinger
from an unforeseen complication in a gene-therapy trial and the death
or disability of participants in the fialuridine trial at the National
Institutes of Health in 1993,24 have called national attention to the
problem of biomedical research related injuries, but have not led to
the creation of a comprehensive framework to provide compensation
to those who are injured.
This lack of progress continues in spite of the work of several
presidential and other commissions charged with examining the issue
of compensation for biomedical research related injuries.25 The subject
was first raised in 1973 when the Department of Health Education
and Welfare (DHEW) convened an ad hoc panel to address the
ethical questions arising from the Tuskegee Syphilis Study.26 Four
Moral Terrain of Clinical Research, 38 HASTINGS CENT. REP. 30, 36
(2008) (stating that “[i]n research on healthy volunteers who have no
prospect of medical benefit from research participation, nonmaleficence
plainly does not require proportionality of risks and benefits for the
subjects themselves. This lack of a requirement for proportionality is
less obvious for sick patient-subjects, but it is still true. In both cases, it
is both ethically justifiable and permissible, within appropriate limits, to
expose research subjects to risks that are justified by the value of the
knowledge to be gained from the research.”). But see id. (emphasizing
also that researchers bear a duty of risk minimization within scientific
constraints).
22.

See, e.g., U.S PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N
ISSUES, supra note 16, at 56.

23.

See Robert Steinbrook, Compensation for Injured Research Subjects,
354 NEJM 1871, 1871 (2006).

24.

See Pike, supra note 15, at 7, 9; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, The Biotech
Death of Jesse Gelsinger, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1999,
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/28/magazine/the-biotech-death-ofjesse-gelsinger.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm; see also Lawrence K.
Altman, The Doctor’s World; Fatal Drug Trial Raises Questions About
‘Informed
Consent’,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
5,
1993,
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/05/science/the-doctor-s-world-fataldrug-trial-raises-questions-about-informedconsent.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm; Marlene Cimons, The Deadly
Risks
of
Research,
L.A.
TIMES,
Aug.
25,
1993,
http://articles.latimes.com/1993-08-25/news/mn-27830_1_drug-trials.

25.

Henry, supra note 13, at 412.

26.

U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, FINAL REPORT OF THE
TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY AD HOC ADVISORY PANEL 7 (1973), available
at http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/cphl/history/reports/tuskegee/report1.pdf.
See also ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS,
FINAL
REPORT
179
(1995),
available
at
https://ia700402.us.archive.org/10/items/advisorycommitte00unit/advis
orycommitte00unit.pdf; see also ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN
RADIATION
EXPERIMENTS,
FINAL
REPORT
(1995),
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years later, the 1977 DHEW Task Force on the Compensation of
Injured Research Subjects concluded that research subjects were
entitled to compensation if they suffered injuries that were
proximately caused by research participation.27 This was followed by
the report of the 1982 President’s Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research, which determined that there was justification for
compensating injured research subjects, and that further study on the
subject was needed.28 The 1995 Advisory Committee on Human
Radiation Experiments recommended the payment of financial
remedies to injured subjects of the World War II-era human radiation
experiments.29 In 2001, the National Bioethics Advisory Committee
found that, as a matter of justice, participants harmed “as a direct
result of research should be cared for and compensated.”30 Most
recently, in 2011, the President’s Commission for the Study of
Bioethical Issues released a report entitled “Moral Science,” in which
it argued that “subjects harmed in the course of human research
should not individually bear the costs of care required to treat harms
resulting directly from that research,” and that the federal
government should further study the need for a national
compensation system.31
As is evident by the strikingly similar conclusions of the 1982 and
2011 reports, policy growth in this area has been staggeringly slow.
Many bioethics commissions attribute the lack of progress to a dearth
of empirical data on the frequency and severity of research related
injuries.32 Still, other authors have attributed the policy intransigence
to “moral gridlock” in the form of disagreement over the ethical
https://ia600402.us.archive.org/10/items/advisorycommitte00unit/advis
orycommitte00unit.pdf (last accessed Aug 9, 2014).
27.

U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, SECRETARY’S
ON THE COMPENSATION OF INJURED RESEARCH SUBJECTS

TASK FORCE
VI-9 (1977),
available
at
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015034851611;view=1up;s
eq=48 (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).

28.

See U.S PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N
supra note 14, at 4-5.

29.

See ADVISORY COMMITTEE
note 26 at 801-05.

30.

See NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, 1 ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES
IN RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS, at v (2001).

31.

U.S PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N
note 16, at 8.

32.

See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, supra note 27, at
III-3; U.S. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS,
supra note 14, at 5; U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF
BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 16, at 62.
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justifications for compensation and what those justifications require of
a compensation system.33
The United States is an outlier among nations in not requiring
compensation for research related injuries.34 The World Medical
Association’s Declaration of Helsinki states that it is a requirement of
ethical human subjects research that, “[a]ppropriate compensation
and treatment for subjects who are harmed as a result of participating
in research must be ensured.”35 The latest formulation of the
Declaration is the first edition to include a requirement for
compensation of research related injuries, and it is one indicator
among many of a growing consensus among governments, policymakers, and commentators that injured research participants are
owed both medical care and financial compensation.36
Wide variation remains, however, in the reasons used to justify a
requirement for compensation and the mechanisms of compensation
used both by countries where research is conducted, and by research
institutions themselves.37 Additionally, different countries have taken
multiple approaches to the problem of compensation for research
related injuries.38 These foreign approaches provide valuable guidance
on how to define “compensable injury” in the United States and
design a domestic system of compensation. Examination of
international systems alone is, however, insufficient to justify the
creation of a national compensation system. It is also necessary to
undertake a robust examination of the ethical principles that justify a
compensation requirement and to analyze how those ethical principles
influence compensation systems already in place. This analysis should
shape the design of any compensation system that is to be
implemented in the United States.

33.

Henry, supra note 13, at 412-13.

34.

Pike, supra note 15, at 39.

35.

WORLD MED. ASS’N, DECLARATION OF HELSINKI, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES
FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS 3 (2013), available
at http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/; see also
Robert V. Carlson et al., The Revision of the Declaration of Helsinki:
Past, Present and Future, 57 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 695, 699
(2004).

36.

See, e.g., Pike, supra note 15, at 10; WORLD MED. ASS’N, supra note 35,
at 3.

37.

David B. Resnik et al., Research-Related Injury Compensation Policies
of U.S. Research Institutions, 36(1) IRB 12, 13 (2014); U.S.
PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra
note 16, at 24; Christopher J. S. Hodges, Research Injury in the
European Community, 5 PHARMA. MED. 135, 135 (1991).

38.

See infra Part I; see also U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF
BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 16, at 57, 186-190.
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The most pressing questions to come out of this process involve
the definition of a “compensable injury.” Careful consideration of the
justifications for providing compensation for research related injuries
will define the contours of which injuries must be compensated by
whom, and will aid in the development of a more comprehensive
analytical framework.39 A survey of both international compensation
systems and past compensation proposals in the United States reveals
that there are four essential elements that systems should consider in
order to fully regulate the provision of compensation for research
related injuries: causation, type, degree, and remedy.40 Each element
in this approach serves to define the contours of a compensable injury
and to determine who owes what to whom.41
This article is the first to lay out a comprehensive definition of
“compensable injury” that is both ethically justified and incorporates
all four regulatory elements. To reach this conclusion, Part I examines
systems of compensation that are already in operation both
domestically and internationally. This analysis reveals that
compensation systems vary in both their definition of “compensable
injury” and their use of causation, type, degree, and remedy. The
experience of international compensation systems reflects different
justifications for the provision of compensation and should be used to
inform the development of any compensation system in the United
39.

The origins of the contemporary bioethics movement are often traced to
the promulgation of the Nuremberg Code in 1949 (Evelyne Shuster,
Fifty Years Later: The Significance of the Nuremberg Code, 337 NEJM
1436, 1436 (1997)), the 1964 publication of the first version of the World
Medical Association’s Declaration of Helsinki (Carlson et al., supra note
35, at 1), and within the United States, to the 1979 Belmont Report,
Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects
of Research [Belmont Report], National Commission for the Protection
of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Office of the
Secretary, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 44 Fed.
Reg. 23,192, 23,193-94 (Apr. 18, 1979) (codified at 45 CFR § 46),
available
at
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.html. The
Belmont Report, published by the National Commission for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research in
the wake of the 1974 National Research Act, set out three core
principles that should guide those engaging in human subjects research:
respect for persons, beneficence, and justice. These foundational ethical
principles have been used to shape the norms currently found in many
ethical codes and regulations governing the conduct of human subjects
research. See Robert J. Levine & Angela R. Holder, Legal and Ethical
Problems in Clinical Research, 7 CLINICAL RES. & REG. AFF. 315, 325
(1989).

40.

See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, supra note 27, at
III-5; see also U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF
BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 16, at 57, 186-190.

41.

See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, Supra note 27, at III-5.
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States. Part II analyzes the justifications that have been put forth for
compensation of research related injuries and argues that
nonmaleficence and justice are the two most important. Part III uses
the ethical justifications and the regulatory lessons developed earlier
in the article to argue for a morally justified approach to defining
compensable research injuries. It ends with a proposal for a
compensation system that would fit with the justifications and
definitions put forth.

I. Compensation Systems Currently In Existence
A. International Compensation Systems

Most countries that host or conduct a significant amount of
research have policies in place that require researchers or sponsors to
provide some level of compensation for treatment of participants’
research related injuries.42 International standard setting bodies such
as the World Medical Association (WMA) and the Council for
International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) have also
argued that compensation for research related injuries is a necessary
component of ethical biomedical research.43 A survey of international
compensation systems reveals four main elements of regulating
compensable research related injuries: cause, type, degree, and
remedy.44 Different nations use multiple combinations of these
elements to determine which research related injuries are entitled to
compensation.45
Within the international community, wide variation exists in the
design of compensation systems used and the degree to which each
system relies on each of the four regulatory elements. At a minimum,
most nations have the requirement that the injury be causally related
42.

U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N
supra note 16, at 57, 186-190.

43.

Id.; see also COUNCIL FOR INT’L ORG. OF MED. SCI., INTERNATIONAL
ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN
SUBJECTS 78 (2002) (“Investigators should ensure that research subjects
who suffer injury as a result of their participation are entitled to free
medical treatment for such injury and to such financial or other
assistance as would compensate them equitably for any resultant
impairment, disability or handicap. In the case of death as a result of
their participation, their dependants [sic] are entitled to
compensation.”); WORLD MED. ASS’N, supra note 35, at 3.

44.

U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC, & WELFARE, supra note 27, at III-5
(discussing these same elements).

45.

See, e.g., U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL
ISSUES, supra note 16, at 186-190; see also Drugs and Cosmetics (1st
Amendment) Rules, 2013, Gazette of India, Part II, Sec. III (i) (Jan. 30,
2013) G.S.R. 53(E).
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to the individual’s research participation.46 Some regulatory systems
either limit or expand the class of eligible claimants by enumerating
the types of injuries for which redress is required.47 Other countries
also limit compensation to physical injuries of a certain degree, for
example, severe or disabling injuries.48 Finally, a number of countries
delineate the type and amount of remedy available.49 It is useful to
look at examples of countries that use different combinations of these
four regulatory parameters in order to illustrate the interaction
between the justifications for compensation identified above and the
definitions of compensable injury chosen.
1. Simple Insurance Systems

Initially, it is noteworthy that many countries do not define in
detail what constitutes a compensable research related injury and
instead have a minimum insurance requirement that research sponsors
must fulfill.50 These simple insurance systems shift some or all of the
cost of research related injuries on to sponsors and leave insurers to
make determinations as to which injuries will be compensated.51
Countries with simple insurance systems have varying levels of access
to the courts for individuals who feel that compensation was
46.

See, e.g., Drugs and Cosmetics (1st Amendment) Rules, 2013, Gazette
of India, Part II, Sec. III (i) (Jan. 30, 2013) G.S.R. 53(E) (India); India
updated the Rules at the time this Article went to print. See Drugs and
Cosmetics (1st Amendment) Rules, 2014, Gazette of India, Part II, Sec.
III (i) (Dec. 12, 2014) G.S.R. 889(E) (India). See also, e.g., Henry
Johansson, The Swedish System for Compensation of Patient Injuries,
115 UPSALA J. MED. SCIENCE 88, 88 (2010); see also Marie Bismark &
Ron Paterson, No-Fault Compensation In New Zealand: Harmonizing
Injury Compensation, Provider Accountability, and Patient Safety, 25
HEALTH AFF. 278, 280 (2006).

47.

See, e.g., Johansson, supra note 46, at 88-90; see also Resolution N.
196/96, de 14 Janeriro de 1987, Risks and Benefits V.6 (Braz.).

48.

See, e.g., SOUTH AFRICA DEP’T OF HEALTH, GUIDELINES FOR GOOD
PRACTICE IN THE CONDUCT OF CLINICAL TRIALS WITH HUMAN
PARTICIPANTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 1, 42 (2 ed. 2006), available at
http://www.kznhealth.gov.za/research/guideline2.pdf.

49.

See, e.g., Chieko Kurihara et al., High Rate of Awarding Compensation
for Claims of Injuries Related to Clinical Trials by Pharmaceutical
Companies in Japan: A Questionnaire Survey, 9 PLoS ONE e84998, 3
(2014).

50.

See U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES,
supra note 16, at 186-90 (listing country compensation requirements
from around the world. Countries with simple insurance requirements
include: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, France,
Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta,
Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom, Brazil,
Israel, Japan, Macedonia, Switzerland, Russia, and Ukraine).

51.

See id.
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inadequate.52 At the opposite end of the spectrum, the United States
and Canada simply require that research subjects be informed as to
whether compensation will be made available, leaving to sponsors all
determinations as to whether compensation will be provided.53
2. Causation

India is a prime example of a nation that regulates compensable
research related injuries primarily based on a determination of what
caused the injury. In a new compensation law passed in 2013,
compensation is required for any injury or death of the subject
occurring in the clinical trial for the following reasons:
(a) adverse effect of investigational product(s);
(b) violation of the approved protocol, scientific misconduct or
negligence by the Sponsor or his representative or the
investigator;
(c) failure of investigational product to provide intended
therapeutic effect;
(d) use of placebo in a placebo-controlled trial;
(e) adverse effects due to concomitant medication excluding
standard care, necessitated as part of approved protocol;
(f) for injury to a child in-utero because of the participation of
parent in clinical trial; or
(g) any clinical trial procedures involved in the study.54

In light of concerns about the conceptual definition of the
compensation requirements55 and the effect the requirements were
52.

See, e.g., Law Concerning Experiments on the Human Person, Art. 29
(Belgium,
2004),
http://www.erasme.ulb.ac.be/page.asp?id=11365&langue=EN#a29
(requiring insurance coverage for liability and also allowing for access to
the courts).

53.

See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(6) (2001); Tri-Council Policy Statement,
Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans, 1, 3-5 (2010),
http://www.pre.ethics.gc.ca/eng/policy-politique/initiatives/tcps2eptc2/chapter3-chapitre3/#toc03-1a.

54.

Drugs and Cosmetics (1st Amendment) Rules, 2013, Gazette of India,
Part II, Sec. III (i) § 2 1, 9 (Jan. 30, 2013) (India).

55.

See REPORT OF THE RANJIT ROY CHANDHARY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE TO
FORMULATE POLICY AND REMOVAL OF NEW DRUGS CLINICAL TRIALS AND
BANNING OF DRUGS 15 (2013) [hereinafter CHAUDHARY REPORT],
available
at
http://cdsco.nic.in/writereaddata/Report_of_Dr_Ranjit_Roy.pdf.
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having on India’s research industry,56 recent regulatory reforms have
tempered the compensation requirement and built upon an expert
report commissioned by India’s Central Drug Standards Control
Organization.57 The new regulations require, among other things,
consideration of whether the standard of care was provided to trial
subjects when determining whether an injury is compensable.58
Although the de minimus causation requirement is the most
noteworthy facet of India’s 2013 law, the regulations also contain
requirements with respect to the types of injury covered and the
remedy owed.59 Although causation comes to the foreground when
discussing India’s compensation regulations, the other regulatory
elements are present, if less pronounced.
3. Type

Brazil, by contrast, broadens the class of eligible claimants by
including all types of injury that may result from research
participation. Brazil’s regulations require that “[r]esearch subjects
that suffer any type of injury resulting from their participation in
research . . . have the right to receive comprehensive medical care, as
well as indemnity.”60 Research injuries are defined as “immediate or
delayed injury to an individual or community, with proven, direct or
indirect, causal relationship resulting from the scientific study.”61 And
risks of research are defined as “possibility of injury to the physical,
psychic, moral, intellectual, social, cultural, or spiritual dimensions of
the human subject, during any phase of an investigation, or resulting
therefrom.”62 Brazil regulates not just by cause, but also by type of
injury, which includes a broad range of injuries that may be
56.

J. Sugarman, et al., India’s New Policy
Participants, 347 BMJ f4841, at 1 (2013).

57.

See CHAUDHARY REPORT, supra note 55, at 6-8; Megan E. Larkin,
Acoustic Separation and Biomedical Research: A Case Study of Indian
Regulations on Compensation for Research-Related Injuries, J. LAW,
MED., & ETHICS (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 1-4) (on file with
author).

58.

See CHAUDHARY REPORT, supra note 55, at 3, 6-7, 85.

59.

See generally GSR 53(E), supra note 54; see also Drugs and Cosmetics
(1st Amendment) Rules, 2013, Gazette of India, Part II, Sec. III (i)
63(E) § 2 1, 4 (Jan. 30, 2013) (India); see also Drugs and Cosmetics
(3rd Amendment) Rules, Gazette of India, Part II, Section III (i) (India)
G.S.R. 73(E) (2013).

60.

Nat’l Health Council Resolution No. 196/96 on Research Involving
Human Subjects § V.6 (1996) (Bra.) [hereinafter N.H.C. Res. No.
196/96]; see also Pike, supra note 15, at 42.

61.

N.H.C. Res. No. 196/96 at II.9.

62.

Id. at II.8.
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considered compensable if found to be suitably research related (i.e.,
having a direct or indirect causal relationship to the research).
Examination of regulations like Brazil’s is important because it raises
the question of whether injuries other than physical and financial ones
should be considered compensable in light of the justifications for
providing compensation.
4. Degree

A third type of regulation considers the degree of injury (in
addition to causation and type) in order to determine which injuries
are compensable. For example, the Association of the British
Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) guidelines recommend compensation
where “[o]n the balance of probabilities, the injury was attributable to
the administration of a medicinal product under trial or any clinical
intervention or procedure provided for by the protocol that would not
have occurred but for the inclusion of the Participant in the trial.”63
The ABPI guidelines further counsel that “[c]ompensation should
only be paid for the more serious injury of an enduring and disabling
character . . . and not for temporary pain or discomfort or less serious
or curable complaints.”64 While these guidelines are voluntary, in
practice they are widely followed. Additionally, when deciding
whether to approve a research proposal, ethics committees are
instructed to consider whether provision has been made for
compensation in the event of serious injury or death.65 Notably,
compensation is limited to those circumstances where care alone does
not remedy the injury.66 A number of countries have modeled their
compensation requirements on the ABPI guidelines.67
5. Remedy

Japan has based its system of compensation largely upon the
ABPI guidelines. It departs from the ABPI model because it contains
a more detailed definition of what amount of compensation is required
63.

THE ASS’N OF BRITISH PHARM. INDUS., CLINICAL TRIAL COMPENSATION
GUIDELINES 4 (2014), available at http://www.abpi.org.uk/ourwork/library/guidelines/Documents/compensation_guidelines_2014.pdf
(last visited Apr. 8, 2014).

64.

Id.

65.

See, e.g., THE ASS’N OF BRIT. PHARM. INDUS., INSURANCE AND
COMPENSATION IN THE EVENT OF INJURY IN PHASE I CLINICAL TRIALS 4-5
(2012),
http://www.abpi.org.uk/ourwork/library/guidelines/Pages/clinical-trials-insurance.aspx (last visited
Aug. 12 2014); see also Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials)
Regulations, 2004, S.I. 2004/1031, art. 3, ¶ 15(5)(i) (U.K.).

66.

See S.I. 2004/1031, Part 3, cl. 15(5)(i) (U.K.); see also Pike, supra note
15, at 62.

67.

Pike, supra note 15, at 42.
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for different types of injuries.68 Japan’s standards for compensation
are based on those of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance
Act, and cover the participant’s costs up to a certain limit (about 70
percent) in exchange for the participant not having to prove
negligence.69 The formula used to calculate the amount of damages
owed includes the type and degree of injury and the participant’s
earning capacity prior to the injury.70 The damages calculated under
the formula are deemed to be those that would have been available
had the participant taken the case to court.71 Those damages are then
reduced by 30 percent.72 The justification for this reduction is that in
lieu of the full amount of damages theoretically available through the
legal system, the participant will receive payment quickly.73 One
commentator has raised concerns that participants in therapeutic
research or in phase one studies designed to test drugs that produce
some benefit at the end of life may be underserved by the current
calculation of damages because of their diminished earning capacity.74
Recently, however, pharmaceutical companies have been narrowing
the definition of compensable injuries to limit available compensation
for less serious injuries (as judged by type and degree).75
Compensation is made available through insurance purchased to cover
such losses.76 Notably, such insurance is not required in all clinical
trials thus leaving some gaps in the compensation available to
participants depending on what type of trial they are enrolled in.77
6. Comprehensive Medical Injury Compensation Systems

A few nations have well-developed compensation systems that
incorporate research related injuries into a larger national framework
for compensation of medical injuries.78 These frameworks take into
68.

See Tatsuo Kuroyanagi, Compensation
and
Insurance
for
Participants/Subjects Harmed in Clinical Research Studies: Process of
the Inheritance of Good Clinical Practice (GCP) in Japan and its
Present Status, 56 JPN. MED. ASSOC. J. 458, 460-61 (2013).

69.

Id. at 461-62.

70.

Id.

71.

Id. at 461.

72.

Id.

73.

Id.

74.

Id.

75.

Id.

76.

Id. at 461-62.

77.

Id. at 463-64.

78.

See, e.g., Patient Injury Act, S-155.87, 9th Riksdag (Swed. 1996),
available
at
http://www.patientforsakring.se/resurser/dokument/engelska_artiklar/
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consideration all four elements of defining an injury and provide a
method for determining which injuries are eligible for compensation.79
Sweden and New Zealand both provide interesting examples of how
such a framework may be set up, and they provide useful lessons for
those considering implementing a robust system of compensation.
Sweden’s system of compensation for medical injuries is premised
on the concept of “avoidability,” which is defined as a medically
necessary action that, according to later evaluation, could have been
avoided by using another available procedure that would have met
the current research need in a less risk-filled manner. Avoidability is
determined from a medical viewpoint in accordance with accepted
standards observed by experienced researchers within the area
concerned.80 Actions performed solely for research purposes are
considered not medically necessary and are therefore entitled to
compensation.81 Payment is provided through the Patient Insurance
Association, which assures the same level of coverage for all public
institutions in Sweden.82 Injuries caused by medication may be
covered by either the Patient Insurance Association or by separate
pharmaceutical insurance depending on the etiology of the injury.83
Claims may be reviewed by the Patient Claims Panel, which is
designed to support fair and consistent interpretation of the Patient
Injury Act. The Panel may also issue opinions at the request of a
claimant, provider, insurer, or court.84 Participants retain a right of
action in the courts throughout the claims process.85
Compensable injuries are defined as personal injuries that are
either physical or mental, so long as the mental injury produces a
“medically demonstrable effect.”86 All injuries must, “with
The_Patient_Injury_Act.pdf; see also Section 2 of the Accident
Compensation Act of 2001, as substituted by Section 10 of the Injury
Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Amendment Act 2005
(N.Z.),
available
at
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2001/0049/latest/DLM99494.
html?src=qs (last visited Aug. 11, 2014) [hereinafter Accident
Compensation Act].
79.

The Patient Injury Act, S-155.87, 9th Riksdag, § 10 (1996); see also
Section 2 of the Accident Compensation Act 2001, supra note 78.

80.

See ULF HELLBACHER ET AL, PARTICIPANT INJURY COMPENSATION
HEALTHCARE-RELATED INJURIES 20-21 (2007).

81.

Id. at 23.

82.

Id. at 14.

83.

Id. at 39-40.

84.

Id. at 14.

85.

Id. at 15.

86.

Id. at 17.
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preponderant probability be caused by measures or conditions” of
treatment in order to be compensable.87 “Direct consequences of the
underlying disease and injuries that would have occurred or developed
anyway, regardless of medical care, are therefore not eligible for
compensation.”88 Most injuries do not have a limit for compensation
based on degree, but injuries caused by infections must be of a type
not reasonably expected to be tolerated by a patient in order for it to
be compensable.89 Compensation is also available for accident related
injuries if they are “related to and typical of healthcare activities.”90
Injuries due to inadequate information or failure to obtain consent are
handled under the general tort law framework.91 Compensation under
the Patient Insurance Act is equal to 80 percent of damages for the
injury as calculated under Section 1 of the Tort Liability Act.92
New Zealand’s system differs slightly from that implemented in
Sweden in both its method of financing compensation and the criteria
used to define “compensable injury.” Unlike Sweden’s system, which
relies on mandatory insurance, New Zealand has adopted a publically
funded system for compensating people with personal injuries that
replaces its tort system.93 New Zealand’s Injury Prevention,
Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act allows coverage for, among
other things, “treatment injuries caused as part of a clinical trial.”94 In
order for compensation to be available, an ethics committee must
have approved the trial and have been satisfied that the trial was not
conducted “principally for the benefit of the manufacturer or
distributor of the medicine or item being trialed.”95 Participants
injured during a trial that was not approved by an ethics committee
or in a trial conducted principally for the benefit of the manufacturer
or distributor have the right to sue for negligence.96 Treatment
injuries that are compensable are defined as “adverse medical events

87.

Id. at 19.

88.

Id.

89.

Id. at 33.

90.

Id. at 39.

91.

Id. at 42.

92.

See id. at 51-53 (reducing the remedy by “one twentieth of the base
amount under the National Insurance Act (1962:381)” under section 9
and an additional 15% under section 16).

93.

Bismark & Paterson, supra note 46, at.278.

94.

HEALTH RESEARCH COUNCIL OF NEW ZEALAND, GUIDELINES ON ETHICS IN
HEALTH RESEARCH 1, 31 (2005), http://www.hrc.govt.nz/news-andpublications/publications/ethics-and-regulatory.

95.

Id.

96.

Id. at 32.
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that must be causally linked to the treatment (but do not require a
finding of fault) and are not a necessary part or ordinary consequence
of the treatment.”97 Treatment injuries do not include those due to
the participant’s underlying health condition, those solely attributable
to resource allocation decisions, or those due to the participant’s
“unreasonably withholding or delaying their consent to treatment.”98
Covered injuries include death, physical injury, mental injury suffered
by a person because of physical injury, and damage to dentures or
prostheses.99
Claims under the system are processed through the Accident
Compensation Corporation (ACC) national claims unit.100 If
participants are unsatisfied with the determination of their claim,
they may request a review of the claim and also retain a right of
appeal to a court.101 Under the Act, treatment and rehabilitation
“includes the cost of pharmaceuticals, disability aids, child care, home
modifications, and vocational retraining.”102 Most health care
treatment costs are already covered by the country’s universal health
care system.103 Compensation for lost earnings includes “weekly
compensation of 80 percent of the claimant’s earnings at the time of
injury, up to a set maximum,” and lump sum compensation up to a
set cap is available for injuries resulting in permanent impairment.104
Support for dependents in the event of a participant’s death is also
available.105 Since 2005, New Zealand does not use degree of injury
when determining whether an injury is compensable.106 Of course, the
level of compensation available depends on the degree of impairment
suffered.107

97.

Id. at 31.

98.

New Zealand Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act,
Public Act 2005 No. 2 § 32(4), 47th Parliament (N.Z. 2005) available at
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2005/0045/latest/DLM34708
4.html?search=sw_096be8ed80ce33e0_research_25_se&p=1
(last
visited Apr. 18, 2014).

99.

Id. at §26(1).

100. Bismark & Paterson, supra note 46, at 280.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 280-81.
105. Id. at 281.
106. Id. at 280 (describing adoption of “treatment injury” in the 2005
reforms).
107. See id. at 280-81.
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New Zealand’s public compensation system notwithstanding, the
New Zealand Researched Medicines Industry has promulgated its own
guidelines that are modeled on those of the ABPI.108 The guidelines
require payment of appropriate compensation (no less than that
available under the ACC) on a no-fault basis to research participants
whose injuries are due—on the balance of the probabilities—to their
participation in a clinical trial.109 Injuries due to the failure of the
studied product to have its intended effect, administration of licensed
medications or placebos in the control arm, departures from the
agreed protocol, wrongful conduct by a third party, or contributory
negligence by the participant are not covered.110 This agreement
voluntarily shifts the cost of compensation for industry-sponsored
trials to industry rather than to the government of New Zealand.
Sweden and New Zealand’s approaches include several elements
that should be incorporated into any compensation system.
Importantly, both systems include an initial determination by an
expert in the field, a uniform system of compensation that is objective
and easily applicable, and procedural protections including a right to
appeal.111 Both systems have thorough statutory and regulatory
underpinnings that clearly define (1) the class of eligible claimants,
(2) which injuries should be covered, and (3) what remedies are
available.112 While the approaches of both Sweden and New Zealand
come from a context in which broad social welfare programs exist,
their methods for sorting out thorny issues such as causation should
be considered when deciding what a no-fault research related injury
compensation system in the United States might look like.113
108. Regulation
of
Clinical
Trials,
http://www.medicinesnz.co.nz/clinical-trials/
2014).

MEDICINES
N.Z.,
(last visited Apr. 18,

109. RESEARCHED MEDICINES INDUS. ASS’N OF N.Z., RESEARCHED MEDICINES
INDUSTRY GUIDELINES ON CLINICAL TRIALS COMPENSATION FOR INJURY
RESULTING FROM PARTICIPATION IN AN INDUSTRY-SPONSORED CLINICAL
TRIAL,
§3,
at
3
(Aug.
2008),
available
at
http://www.medicinesnz.co.nz/assets/Uploads/compensation-guidelines0808-final.pdf.
110. Id. This should be contrasted with the approach taken in India’s 2013
regulations, which do require compensation for the failure of the
intervention to have its intended effect, departure from the agreed
protocol, wrongful conduct of investigators, and in spite of any potential
contributory negligence by the participant/subject. See GSR 53(e),
supra note 54.
111. See supra notes 80, 94, 98, 100 and accompanying text.
112. See id.
113. Indeed, some commentators have argued that Sweden’s system should
be replicated in the United States. Allen B Kachalia et al., Beyond
Negligence: Avoidability and Medical Injury Compensation, 66 SOC. SCI.
MED. 387, 387 (2008).
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7. Lessons from the International Community

Examples from the international community illustrate the fact
that the most complete frameworks for compensation of research
related injuries define injuries using all four regulatory elements:
cause, type, degree, and remedy. Considering all four elements is
important because any system that discounts one or more of them
lacks the definitional clarity that is necessary for a compensation
system to be both ethically grounded and practically functional.
Systems that have less well-rounded definitions of what injuries are
compensable often leave the definitional questions to insurers or other
non-state parties which gives those parties the power to limit the
criteria for compensation in ways that are inconsistent with the
justifications underlying a compensation requirement.114 A clear
definition of compensable injury that incorporates all four regulatory
elements gives research participants notice of what injuries will be
covered and to what extent.115 A clear definition also has the
advantage of ensuring that like cases are treated alike, and that
participants with similar injuries are not treated differently based on
arbitrary factors like the location of the study or a lack of guidance.
The problems associated with a lack of definitional clarity are
evident in the American approach to compensation for research
related injuries. The Common Rule requires only that research
participants be informed as to whether compensation is available, and
it does not even attempt to define what would constitute a
compensable injury.116 As a result, the question is left to individual
institutions and insurers, resulting in wide variability in the remedies
available.
B. Domestic Compensation Systems

The United States has no uniform requirement for compensation
of research related injuries.117 The Code of Federal Regulations
requires only that research participants be made aware of whether
compensation is available for research related injuries during the
informed consent process.118 Different institutions within the United
114. See Larkin, supra note 57.
115. See Leslie Meltzer Henry et al., Just Compensation: A No-Fault
Proposal for Research Related Injuries (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript
at 20) (on file with the author).
116. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(6) (2013).
117. Id. (“For research involving more than minimal risk, an explanation as
to whether any compensation and an explanation as to whether any
medical treatments are available if injury occurs and, if so, what they
consist of, or where further information may be obtained.”).
118. Id.
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States therefore create and implement their own compensation
policies.119 The lack of uniform agreement on compensation has led to
widespread variation in the availability of compensation for research
related injuries.120 In the past twelve years, there has been virtually no
change in the number of institutions offering compensation for
research related injuries in the United States.121 It continues to be the
case that, of the institutions for which data is available, more than
half offer no compensation and only 5 percent offer unconditional
compensation.122 The result of this patchwork approach to
compensation is that research participants’ ability to receive
compensation for research related injuries is almost entirely dependent
on where they are enrolled in research.123 This is even true among
participants enrolled at different research sites in the same trial.124
Within institutions, the availability of compensation may depend
on the sponsor of the clinical trial.125 Many academic institutions that
host clinical trials require industry sponsors to provide compensation
for research related injuries, but do not require government or nonprofit sponsors to do the same.126 Because there is no reliable no-fault
mechanism for compensation of research related injuries, most
participants must turn to the tort system in hope of recovery.127 The
tort system is widely regarded as inadequate to meet the need for
compensation for research related injuries because it requires proof of
culpable conduct on the part of sponsors or investigators and there
are numerous other barriers to compensation for many classes of
research participants.128
The availability of coverage varies widely among institutions that
provide care or compensation for research related injuries. For
example, the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, National Institutes of
Health, and the Department of Defense provide free, short-term
medical care for all research related injuries, but other compensation
119. Resnik et al., supra note 37, at 2.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 6.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2.
124. Id.
125. See Michael K. Paasche-Orlow & Frederick L Brancati, Assessment of
Medical School Institutional Review Board Policies Regarding
Compensation of Subjects for Research-Related Injury, 118 AM. J. MED.
175, 179 (2005).
126. Id.
127. Pike, supra note 15, at 43-44.
128. Id.
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is not available.129 Since 2000, Medicare has paid for care for injured
patient/participants (not healthy volunteers) who are Medicare
beneficiaries.130 These systems ignore factors related to the type and
degree of injury and have only a bare-bones causation requirement
coupled with a specification of the type of remedy available—namely,
medical care.131 In the wake of the Affordable Care Act, private
insurers are now also required to pay for participation in clinical trials
for cancer or similarly life threatening diseases, but whether this
payment extends to coverage for research related injuries is unclear.132
Until mid-2014, the University of Washington was widely
regarded as having one of the most robust systems of compensation
for research related injury. It defined a research related injury as a
bodily injury, and stated that:
[E]xcept in special circumstances, the term does not include
impairment of mental processes or emotional distress, nor does
it encompass effects resulting from: (1) injuries from diagnostic
or therapeutic procedures, either standard or experimental,
performed as part of patient management; (2) the normal course
of a disease or condition; or (3) non-compliance with study
procedures.133

This is a developed definition that sets forth the type of injury
covered and some limitations on the cause of the injury.134
Compensation under the original University of Washington system

129. 38 U.S.C. § 501 (2014); 38 C.F.R. § 17.85 (2014) (“VA medical facilities
shall provide necessary medical treatment to a research subject injured
as a result of participation in a research project approved by a VA
Research and Development Committee and conducted under the
supervision of one or more VA employees.”). The VA does not cover
injuries caused by subject non-compliance with study procedures. Id.; 32
C.F.R. §108.4(i) (2014); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 3216.02 26
(2011),
available
at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/321602p.pdf; see also
Pike, supra note 15, at 25.
130. Pike, supra note 15, at 25.
131. 38 C.F.R. § 17.85; 32 C.F.R. § 108.4(i).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–8 (2012). See also Insurance Coverage for Clinical
SOC.
CLINICAL
ONCOLOGY,
Trial
Participants,
AM.
http://www.asco.org/insurance-coverage-clinical-trial-participants (last
visited Mar 27, 2015).
133. UNIV. OF WASH., HUMAN SUBJECTS MANUAL 7, available at
http://staff.washington.edu/brz/MANUAL/99-VII.htm (last visited
Apr. 24, 2014).
134. See id.
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was limited to the cost of care, and it failed to factor in economic
damages.135
The University of Washington system was revised in September
2014 in part to “accommodate numerous changes in health care
systems.”136 The changes restrict the availability of compensation to
only healthy volunteers in clinical trials.137 This removes
patient/participants from the pool of eligible claimants and precludes
compensation for most individuals enrolled in research that has a
prospect of direct medical benefit to the research participant.138 The
new policy also caps the amount of medical reimbursement at
$250,000.139 While the change to this policy is understandable in light
of the current climate of the health care market, it reflects a setback
for institutions attempting to provide coverage to injured research
participants.
As these examples demonstrate, the compensation available to
American research subjects—when there is compensation at all—is
similar in structure to that available in much of Europe.140 It is either
insurance or self-insurance that covers the cost of medical care.141
American systems largely lack compensation for economic damages
and long-term disability.142 These systems, for the most part, do not
attend to all four regulatory elements instead leaving core definitional
determinations to third parties.

II. Retrospective Nonmaleficence and Distributive and
Compensatory Justice as Justifications for
Compensation
In the past four decades, a number of scholars have put forth
justifications for compensating research related injuries.143
135. Id.
136. Revised Injury Compensation Program, UNIV. OF WASH. HUMAN
SUBJECTS
DIV.
(Sept.
15,
2014)
http://www.washington.edu/research/hsd/announcements/?q=1645.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., ABPI Guidelines 2001, supra note 63, (describing sponsorbased insurance of costs. It is similar to the University of Washington
system in terms of the structure, but is far more comprehensive in its
definition of what is covered and in the compensation available).
141. See supra Part I.A.
142. See 38 C.F.R. § 17.85; see also 32 C.F.R. § 108.4(j); U.S. DEP’T
DEF., supra note 129, at 26; UNIV. OF WASH, supra note 133, at 8.

OF

143. See, e.g., Levine & Holder, supra note 39, at 1; see also David B.
Resnik, Compensation for Research-Related Injuries, Ethical and Legal
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Justifications have included theories based in beneficence,144
nonmaleficence,145 distributive justice,146 compensatory justice,147 and
cost-shifting.148 These proposed justifications often pull in different
directions and do not always align with the means of compensation
contemplated.149 The justifications also diverge with respect to the
definition of what constitutes a research related injury and when such
an injury should be compensable.150 It is therefore necessary to
determine which justifications are warranted, and what those
justifications imply for the definition of a research related injury and
how that injury should be remedied. This requires reasoning from the
principles underlying biomedical research ethics and applying them to
the distinct problem of research related injuries.151 In particular, it is
important to engage in this exercise to understand what harms
compensation should address and to ensure that the means of redress
are consonant with the aims.152 The ethical principles underlying a
compensation requirement help to define the universe of eligible
claimants, determine which injuries are covered, and identify the
appropriate remedy.153

Issues, 27 J. LEG. MED. 263–87 (2006); Henry, supra note 13, at 411-412
(noting the variety of justifications for compensation that have been put
forth).
144. Resnik, supra note 143, at 265-66.
145. See, e.g., Joffe & Miller, supra note 21, at 36.
146. U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N
supra note 16, at 58.
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147. Levine & Holder, supra note 39, at 343.
148. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the
Law of Torts, 70 YALE L. J. 499, 514 (1961).
149. See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, Compensating Persons Injured in
Human Experimentation, 169 SCIENCE 153, 153-57 (1970); Alan J.
Weisbard, On Not Compensating for Bad Outcomes to Biomedical
Innovation, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161, 1167-69 (1987); Henry, supra note
13, at 412.
150. See infra Part II.
151. See, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 12 (Oxford Univ. Press, 6th ed. 2009).

OF

152. See, e.g., G. Owen Schaefer & Alan Wertheimer, The Right to Withdraw
From Research, 20 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 329, 330 (2010) (discussing
the importance of providing a moral foundation for the right to
withdraw).
153. See infra Part III.

332

Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015
Defining Compensable Injury in Biomedical Research

Obligations to provide compensation154 and care155 to injured
research subjects can be found in the core ethical principles of
nonmaleficence (closely linked to, but distinct from, beneficence) and
justice. As argued below, each principle supports different, though
overlapping obligations to provide compensation for research related
injuries, and each principle places the obligation of compensation on a
different actor.
A. Retrospectivity, Beneficence, and Nonmaleficence

Beneficence and nonmaleficence are often regarded as paired
obligations. Beneficence is a moral obligation to act to benefit
others.156 The duty of beneficence “rest[s] on the mere fact that there
are other beings in the world whose condition we can make better.”157
If not limited in some way, an obligation of beneficence would be
difficult to apply because it is potentially boundless.158 Stronger duties
of beneficence may, therefore, arise based on an individual’s role
relationship; for example, a doctor or a clinical researcher may have
general duties of beneficence to their patients or research
participants.159 A general duty of beneficence is applicable in the
research context, but such a duty does not create an obligation to
provide compensation for research related injuries.160 This is so
because the general duty of beneficence can be discharged in other
ways.161 Broadly put, “rules of beneficence state positive requirements
of action, need not always be followed impartially, and rarely, if ever,
provide moral reasons that support legal punishment when agents fail

154. “Compensation” is used throughout this piece to refer to monetary
compensation, which should include compensation for the cost of
medical care.
155. “Care” and “treatment” are used interchangeably throughout this piece
to refer to medical care.
156. Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., What Makes Clinical Research Ethical?, 283
JAMA 2701, 2706 (2000); BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 151, at
197.
157. DAVID DEGRAZIA
W.D. Ross).

ET AL,

BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 25 (7th ed. 2010) (quoting

158. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 151, at 197-99
(attempting to narrow and define an obligatory account of beneficence).
159. See id. at 205.
160. Henry, supra note 13, at 416.
161. See Tom Beauchamp, The Principle of Beneficence in Applied Ethics,
in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 5-6 (Edward N. Zalta
ed.,
2013),
available
at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/principlebeneficence/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2014).
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to abide by the rules.”162 The general duty of beneficence, therefore,
provides a reason for providing benefit to research subjects, but does
not specify that the benefit must be in the form of compensation for
research related injuries.
Notwithstanding the generally weak form of the duty of
beneficence, there are some instances in which a strong duty of
beneficence applies.163 The most widely agreed upon of these is the
duty to rescue. The duty to rescue requires that an individual “make
efforts to rescue strangers under conditions of minimal risk.”164 For
example, consider a case where A is on the bank of a river, and B has
fallen in. There is a life preserver next to A on the bank of the river
that A could toss to B (saving B’s life) with little or no risk to A. In
such a case, the perfect duty of beneficence would counsel that A has
an obligation to throw the life preserver to B.
The perfect duty of beneficence found in the duty to rescue does
not, however, imply an obligation to compensate for research related
injuries. This is because the payment of compensation is not a rescue
scenario. The injury has already occurred at the time compensation
would be given, and any peril from a lack of compensation is not
imminent. The duty to provide emergent medical care is adequately
covered by researchers’ obligation of nonmaleficence, and any need for
compensation is separate and apart from the subject’s medical needs.
Duties of nonmaleficence, in contrast to those of beneficence, “rest
on the complementary fact that [one] can also make the condition of
other beings worse . . . [and can be] summed up under the heading of
‘not injuring others.’”165 Nonmaleficence in the context of biomedical
research “requires that researchers who work with human subjects
strive to minimize, consistent with the scientific aims of their
research, the risks and burdens their experimental procedures
impose.”166 Unlike beneficence, a duty of nonmaleficence in research
specifically requires compensation for injury as a way to minimize the
risks imposed on subjects.167 Nonmaleficence, as spelled out in greater
detail below, is both prospective and retrospective; it requires

162. Id. at 5.
163. Id. at 6.
164. Id. at 5.
165. DEGRAZIA ET AL., supra note 157, at 25.
166. Joffe & Miller, supra note 21, at 36.
167. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 151, at 153 (“Obligations of
nonmaleficence include not only obligations not to inflict harms, but
also obligations not to impose risks of harm. A person can harm or place
another person at risk without malicious or harmful intent, and the
agent of harm may or may not be morally or legally responsible for the
harms.”).
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minimization of foreseeable risks of research and also minimization of
the effects that risk taking has on research subjects.
The duty of risk minimization is limited, in principle, by the
requirement that risks be minimized only to the extent consistent
with the scientific aims of the research.168 The Common Rule,
recognizing that risk elimination is not feasible, requires only that
institutional review boards (IRBs) ensure that research presents a
reasonable risk-benefit profile.169 In particular, it is widely accepted
that “it is both ethically justifiable and permissible, within
appropriate limits, to expose research subjects to risks that are
justified by the value of the knowledge to be gained from the
research.”170 Reasonable limits on risk minimization may stem from
concerns about cost, subject autonomy, or scientific integrity. These
limits notwithstanding, provision of care and compensation is
necessary to both maximize possible benefits and also minimize
possible harms.171 It can be accomplished without attempting to
eliminate risks entirely, or taking the principle of risk minimization to
an extreme.172
There are different types of risk to which the principle of
nonmaleficence and the corresponding duty to minimize risk might
apply. The two most salient are biomedical and financial. It is well
accepted that both types of risk should be considered when
determining which research to undertake, and whether an injured
participant may be entitled to compensation.173 The boundaries of the
168. See Joffe & Miller, supra note 21, at 36.
169. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2013) (detailing the Common Rule criteria
for IRB approval of research); see also DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. &
WELFARE,
THE
BELMONT
REPORT
(1979),
available
at
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.html#xass
ess; see also the Nuremberg Code, stating “that the degree of risk
‘should never exceed that determined by the humanitarian importance
of the problem to be solved by the experiment.’” quoted in Pike, supra
note 15, at 15.
170. Joffe & Miller, supra note 21, at 36.
171. See infra Section II. See also Larkin, supra note 57, at 5.
172. A full account of the boundaries of an obligation to minimize risks is
beyond the scope of this article, but it is clear that within those
boundaries there remains a strong duty to engage in risk minimization,
and there is a role for compensation to play in fulfilling this duty.
173. See, e.g., Rid & Wendler, supra note 21, at 149 (stating that “potential
harms of all types—physical, psychological, social, and economic,”
should be considered when conducting a risk-benefit analysis), Charles
Weijer, The Ethical Analysis of Risk, 28(4) J. L., MED. & ETHICS 344,
346 (2000) (identifying four types of risk: physical, psychological, social,
and economic); see also Richard S. Saver, Medical Research and
Intangible Harm, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 941, 944-946 (2006) (discussing
intangible harms of medical research).
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duty to minimize risk are somewhat ill-defined, but they do not
counsel against a definition of risk that encompasses both biomedical
and financial harm.174 The aim of a definition of risk should be to
ensure that the risk-benefit calculus accurately reflects the costs of the
research. Providing prompt medical care minimizes biomedical risks,175
while paying for that care minimizes financial risks. 176
Under the current framework for regulation of biomedical
research, institutional review boards (IRBs) play an important role in
risk minimization and participant protection.177 They are tasked with
evaluating the risks and benefits of a proposed study, and with
ensuring that the research proposed presents a favorable risk-benefit
profile. In many other countries, IRB178 review includes an assessment
of whether provision has been made for compensation in the event of
a research related injury, but in the United States, such an analysis is
not required.179 IRBs also have a central role in approving the process
for obtaining informed consent to research and ensuring that potential
participants are adequately informed of the risks and benefits
attendant to participation.180 These measures are a form of
prospective nonmaleficence—the forward-looking minimization of
possible harms before the research begins.
Reliance on IRBs to mitigate or eliminate all potential harms of
research, however, risks overstating both their role and their

174. In fact, the financial risk to research participants has historically been
considered as a reason for their compensation. See, e.g., Pike, supra note
15, at 18-20 (examining the historical reasons given for compensation,
which include concerns over financial harm to research subjects).
175. Minimization of biomedical risks may also help avert future financial
risks by avoiding the need for more medical care.
176. See, e.g., D. R. Vasgird et al., Protecting the Uninsured Human
Research Subject, 6(6) J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. PRACTICE 37, 37 (2000).
See also Resnik, supra note 143, at 266. See also D. U. Himmelstein et
al., MarketWatch: Illness and Injury as Contributors to Bankruptcy, 2
HEALTH AFF. W5-63 (2005).
177. See Emanuel et al., supra note 156, at 2701.
178. In other countries boards that perform the same function as IRBs may
go by different names, for example, Research Ethics Committees (RECs)
or Ethics Committees. See, e.g., Drugs and Cosmetics (First
Amendment) Rules (2013) GAZETTE OF INDIA, Part II - Section 3 - Subsection (i) G.S.R. 53(E).
179. See, e.g., Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations, 2004
S.I. 1031 (U.K.); see also U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF
BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 16, at 186-90.
180. Emanuel et al., supra note 156, at 2701.
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institutional competence.181 IRB approval alone does not ensure that
research is conducted in an ethically appropriate manner, or that
subjects are adequately informed of the risks of participation,
particularly when explicit consideration of the financial risks of
participation is not necessarily part of the ethical analysis conducted
by either researchers or the IRBs that oversee them.182 Provision of
IRB review of clinical trials does not, therefore, eliminate the need for
compensation in the case of injury, which provides a different and
supplemental type of protection. In particular, concerns related to
retrospective nonmaleficence—mitigating the effect of harm that has
already occurred—are not incorporated in the current IRB review
process.
One objection to the risk-based argument in favor of
compensation is that subjects who give their informed consent to
participate in research assume the risks inherent in that research and
make a gift of themselves to society.183 On its face, this argument is
attractive because people are allowed to assume many risks in their
day-to-day lives. For example, people are permitted to assume the
risk of sports such as skiing and commonly waive liability before they
take to the slopes.184 Underlying the assumption of risk argument and
its appeal is the notion that people may freely assume risks when they
have knowledge of the risks and voluntarily give their informed
consent to undertake them.185 Arguments about assumption of risk

181. See Seema K. Shah, Outsourcing Ethical Obligations: Should the Revised
Common Rule Address the Responsibilities of Investigators and
Sponsors?, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 397, 397 (2013).
182. See id.
183. See U.S. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS, supra note 14, at 53-56. It should be acknowledged that this
argument may be more salient in the case of altruistic research
participation and that it is potentially inapplicable in “net benefit”
research where the subject at the time of enrollment has a prospect for
direct biomedical benefit from clinical trial participation. In such cases
there is considerable doubt as to whether the research participant
intends to make a gift of him or herself to society.
184. See generally C. Connor Crook, JD, Validity and Enforceability of
Liability Waivers on Ski Lift Tickets, 28 CAMPBELL L. REV. 107, 107–
121 (2005) (surveying state laws regarding the validity and
enforceability of lift ticket waivers); see also Karen E. Crummy,
Colorado Ski Industry Enjoys Protection From Law, Waivers, DENVER
POST, Mar. 3, 2013, http://www.denverpost.com/ci_22813161/coloradoski-industry-enjoys-protection-from-law-waivers.
185. See U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N
supra note 16, at 59.
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are, however, misapplied to the question of compensation for research
related injury.186
Research subjects are not well positioned to make good decisions
about when to assume risks in research, and when to avoid them. As
the President’s Commission stated:
[I]n helping to advance research, human subjects sometimes
place themselves in a position of informational asymmetry,
where they must rely on the expertise and wisdom of
researchers, reviewers, funding institutions, and, at times,
their own physicians to ensure that a research study in
which they enroll is designed and deployed with their rights
and welfare in mind.187
Informational asymmetry may mean that subjects do not
necessarily have a full or accurate appreciation of the risks of the
research they are participating in, even after they have gone through
the informed consent process.188 Risks, as they appear in biomedical
research, “are a function of two more basic components: (1) the
likelihood that a harmful event or experience will occur as a result of
an intervention, and (2) the extent to which the event or experience,
should it occur, sets back the individual participant’s interests.”189
Risk evaluation requires both an empirical judgment “about how
robust and relevant the available data are regarding the potential
harms and benefits of the interventions,” and a normative judgment
of whether the magnitude of the risk to the individual is justified by
186. The Secretary’s Task Force (1977) concluded that, “informed consent
does not negate or waive the obligation to provide compensation. The
case is similar to that of persons who have been injured in the course of
voluntary military service. The fact that a person has volunteered does
not eliminate that person’s right to be compensated in the event of
injury, whether or not the injury was foreseeable. The Task Force agrees
that consent should not negate the rights of research volunteers.
Informed consent in the research setting functions as a recognition of
and a protection for a person’s integrity and autonomy, but does not
imply a waiver of the right of the person to compensation in the event
of injury.” HEW SECRETARY’S TASK FORCE ON THE COMPENSATION OF
INJURED RESEARCH SUBJECTS, supra note 27.
187. U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N
supra note 16, at 70.
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188. See, e.g., U.S. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS, supra note 14, at 58-59. (“Remote risks of serious harms are
especially likely to attend experimental procedures. Consent in such
cases is necessarily somewhat blind, and true appreciation of cases is
necessarily somewhat blind, and true appreciation of risk is doubtful,
even for ideally competent subjects.”).
189. Rid & Wendler, supra note 21, at 148-49.

338

Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015
Defining Compensable Injury in Biomedical Research

the potential for the research to benefit society.190 There is ample
room for an individual participant to either misapprehend or
misevaluate the nature of the known risks of proposed research
participation, or the likely value of his or her research participation to
the advancement of medical science.191
While subjects may not have a full understanding or appreciation
of the risks of research, sponsors and research institutions are better
positioned to understand these risks. Current guidelines and standards
require researchers to weigh the risks of research against the risks of
“comparator activities,” such as those encountered in daily life or
ordinary medical care.192 Such an evaluation should consider both the
physical and economic risks that a given research activity poses.193
That some financial risk accompanies a research related injury is
foreseeable by the study sponsor or research institution, and the
financial risk can be offset by those same institutions that are best
placed to identify and avoid it.194 Researchers and sponsors have an
obligation to weigh the risk to individual subjects against the value of
the research, and will be better able to determine when the risk is
unacceptably high such that it is not worth conducting the research
at all.
Often the full risks of participation in medical research are
unknown, even to the researchers themselves.195 One way to minimize
190. Id. at 143.
191. Id. at 145 (arguing that “[d]etermining that a study achieves a
minimum level of social value requires detailed knowledge of the
research topic, as well as knowledge of the scientific methods proposed
in the study.”).
192. Annette Rid et al., Evaluating the Risks of Clinical Research, 304
JAMA 1472, 1472-73 (2010).
193. Id.
194. See, e.g. Schaefer & Wertheimer, supra note 152, at 337-38. While
researchers may not be in a perfect position to make individualized
judgments about the impact of financial risk on any particular research
participant, certain generalizations about the impact of financial risk
may be applicable. For example, low-income or uninsured individuals
are likely to suffer much more if a financial risk materializes than
higher-income individuals who may have the ability to take paid sick
leave or rely on a disability insurance policy. Even with these
differences, however, the risk mitigation strategy is the same: free care
and compensation for financial injury should the risk materialize.
195. See, e.g., D.R. Vasgird et al., supra note 176, at 45; WENDY MARINER,
COMMITTEE ON ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES RELATING TO THE INCLUSION
OF WOMEN IN CLINICAL STUDIES & INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, WOMEN AND
HEALTH RESEARCH: ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF INCLUDING WOMEN IN
CLINICAL STUDIES 117 (1994); U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE
STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 16, at 58; see also U.S.
PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS, supra
note 14, at 9-10.
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the net effects196 of unknown or unknowable risks is to ensure that
subjects exposed to such risks do not have to pay the full cost of
treatment if the risks are realized and require medical care.197 Viewed
this way, the financial risk is separate from the medical risk, and the
net effects of that risk are subject to mitigation through guaranteed
compensation. As has been argued in the context of the right to
withdraw from research, “[g]iven that informed consent is insufficient
to protect subjects from misjudging the full costs of participating in a
study, society may prefer to protect individuals from the consequences
of their nonculpable misjudgments.”198 When reasonable compensation
for research related injuries is guaranteed, injured research subjects
are protected from both unforeseen and underappreciated risks.
Medical care can be incredibly expensive, and, depending on the
financial resources of the participant, can lead to significant financial
harm, such as bankruptcy.199 Compensation is therefore aligned with
the requirements of the principle of nonmaleficence as applied in
biomedical research. No other approach can adequately shield
research subjects from bearing the full weight of unforeseen or
underestimated risks while simultaneously providing a financial
incentive for study sponsors and institutions to engage in proactive
risk minimization.
Even a general duty to minimize risks, aside from the issue of
compensation, is open to criticism. Benjamin Sachs argues that the
requirement of risk minimization is an example of bioethics
“exceptionalism” because we do not require risk minimization in
analogous relationships, such as those between employers and
employees or volunteer organizers and volunteers.200 In particular,
Sachs contends that the “distinction between necessary and
unnecessary risks is largely absent from our moral reasoning about the
employer-employee relationship,” and that we primarily concern
ourselves with whether employees are adequately compensated for

196. The net effects of a risk are the ways in which the risk materializes for
the affected individual, for example, by causing an injury that requires
further medical care or days off from work.
197. See, e.g. Resnik, supra note 143, at 266 (relying on beneficence as the
root of the same risk minimization obligation and arguing that “[i]f a
subject has been harmed by a research-related injury, beneficence
obligates researchers to try to minimize the additional harms that may
occur to the subject as a result of the injury. Researchers can fulfill this
obligation by providing the subject with medical care or financial
compensation.”).
198. Schaefer & Wertheimer, supra note 152, at 338.
199. Himmelstein, supra note 176.
200. Benjamin Sachs, The Exceptional Ethics of the Investigator-Subject
Relationship, 35 J. MED. PHILOS. 64, 70 (2010).
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taking those risks.201 While Sachs concedes that the duty to minimize
risks and concern over necessary versus unnecessary risks reemerges in
the context of volunteer-organizer/volunteer relationships, he
concludes that exceptionalism of this type is difficult to defend
because it fails to treat morally analogous relationships alike with the
result of imposing restrictions on research that are not ethically
necessary.202
Sachs’s argument is flawed because it is based on a faulty
premise. Society does require risk management in the employment
context. Regulatory bodies like OSHA regularly mitigate the risks to
which employers may expose their employees.203 Workmen’s
compensation reduces the financial hazards associated with irreducible
workplace risks.204 When a job is viewed as unacceptably risky, it is
open to judgment that it should either be changed to reflect a more
favorable risk-benefit profile, or it should be discontinued.205 The
example by which Sachs chooses to illustrate his point is particularly
demonstrative. He cited the National Football League as an example
of allowing individuals to knowingly accept the risks of a job, without
any obligation on the part of the employer to minimize those risks.206
As the recent scandal over the risk of traumatic brain injury in
football demonstrates, there is a concern that the risks of head injury
are not “necessary” to the sport of football, and a legal and ethical
obligation has been placed on the NFL to study and minimize the
risks of concussion going forward, and to compensate players who are
currently suffering from the lasting effects of traumatic brain injury.207

201. Id.
202. Id. at 70-71, 75.
203. See U.S. DEP’T LABOR, OSHA LAW AND REGULATIONS, available at
https://www.osha.gov/law-regs.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2014).
204. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, available at
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/workcomp (last visited Oct. 18, 2014).
205. Of course, it is possible that we as a society allow people to take on
greater risks in the employment context than as participants in
biomedical research because individuals may be financially compensated
for taking riskier jobs. It is much more contentious, however, whether ex
ante financial compensation is appropriate to offset the risks of research
participation. See generally Christine Grady, Payment of Clinical
Research Subjects, 115 J. CLIN. INVEST. 1581, 1581 (2005).
206. Sachs, supra note 200.
207. See Ron Winslow, NFL Union Funds Study of Injury Risk, WALL ST. J.,
Jan.
29,
2013,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323644904578270212095
595572 (last visited Apr. 22, 2015). See, e.g., Editorial: What Players’
Brain Damage Will Cost the NFL, CHI. TRIB., July 15, 2014,
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-national-
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The requirement to minimize risks in the researcher-participant
relationship is not, therefore, an example of bioethics exceptionalism,
but rather a specific execution of a principle broadly applicable to
similar relationships in our society.
Nonmaleficence, as argued above, creates an obligation to provide
compensation for research related injuries. The next question to be
answered is then, who bears the duty generated by the principle of
nonmaleficence? As previously argued, nonmaleficence requires first
that those conducting or sponsoring the research not intentionally
cause harm, and second, that the risks of participation in research be
minimized.208 Nonmaleficence, as applied in the research setting, holds
that there is a stronger duty to act when there is a duty of care.209 It
therefore places the duty to compensate research subjects at the feet
of the sponsors of medical research and the institutions that conduct
it. Of the possible duty bearers, these entities are best positioned to
minimize the risks to research participants because they have the best
understanding of the risks inherent in the research and the
evidentiary base underlying the testing of any intervention. They are
also in the best position to make appropriate financial or risk
spreading arrangements so that the net effects of risk may be
mitigated rather than being borne entirely by the injured research
participants.
B. Justice

An obligation to provide compensation for research related injury
is also supported by the principle of justice. In particular, three
different formulations of the principle of justice—compensatory,
distributive and reparative—support a requirement for compensation.
Underlying these concerns is the fact that “[u]nintended harm is
inevitable in the course of human subjects research,” and although the
benefits of research are shared broadly, the risks fall almost
exclusively upon those who volunteer to be research subjects.210
Distributive justice “refers to fair, equitable, and appropriate
distribution [of resources that must] be determined by justified norms
that structure the terms of social cooperation.”211 As applied to
compensation for research related injury, it suggests that benefits
should be distributed in a manner that accounts for the
football-league-concussion-edit-20140715-story.html (last visited Oct. 18,
2014).
208. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 151, at 149-155.
209. See, e.g., Joffe & Miller, supra note 21, at 36.
210. U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra
note 16, at 58.
211. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 151, at 226.
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disproportionate burden borne by some research subjects.
Compensatory justice, in a related vein, is concerned with
compensation for risks undertaken on behalf of others.212 Reparative
justice, by contrast, is a form of corrective justice that is intended to
repair an injury wrongfully caused by the actions of another.213
Discussed below are the ways in which the different justice concerns
translate into an obligation to compensate participants for research
related injuries.
1. Distributive and Compensatory Justice

At its core, the principle of distributive justice is concerned with
the distribution of scarce benefits in competitive environments, and
with the distribution of burdens that are borne by a subset of an
overtly similar class.214 In a more particularized formulation, “[t]he
principle of distributive justice requires that those who take the risks
of research should receive the benefits.”215 As Wendy Mariner
explains:
Compensation is a means of redressing the imbalance between
the risks undertaken by research subjects and the benefits. Since
most legitimate research is intended to benefit society as a
whole, the subject assumes the risks for society’s sake (some
would say making a gift to society). Therefore, society has a
moral obligation to make the injured subject whole by
compensating those who took the risks and suffered thereby.216

Risks are theoretically distributed evenly among research
participants selected without prejudice. The harm to a participant
who is actually injured, however, may be either ameliorated or
exacerbated by the participant’s background conditions. In countries
and health systems where there is no social safety net and the cost of
medical care is borne largely by the individual participant, the
magnitude of the risk of any given research injury is dependent on
individual factors that are to some extent uncontrollable by the
research sponsor or institution. For example, the cost of care for a
research related injury may have a disproportionately large impact on
an individual who does not have many financial resources, or who is
212. See Henry, supra note 13, at 417.
213. Id. at 413 (reparative justice is “a form of corrective justice intended to
make an injured party whole again, but while compensation counteracts
a loss or harm that may not be due to any wrongdoing, reparations
‘repair’ an injury to one party that is wrongfully caused by another.”).
214. Levine & Holder, supra note 39, at 328.
215. MARINER, supra note 195, at 116.
216. Id.
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uninsured.217 Health insurance also does not guarantee that a patient
will not suffer significant costs associated with a research related
injury, as coverage and coverage caps will vary between plans.218 Even
in countries with partial or full safety nets, available medical care
may not make the injured participant whole again in light of other
costs of the injury, such as time lost from work or continuing
disability.219 The level of risk undertaken by each participant in a
study could be more evenly distributed through provision of financial
compensation for research related injuries because external financial
factors would be controlled for, leaving the inevitable biomedical
differences as the primary source of differences in individual risk
burden.
Compensatory justice has slightly different theoretical
underpinnings than distributive justice, but reaches much the same
result. Compensatory justice is rooted in the principle of fairness and
aims to compensate individuals for risks undertaken on behalf of
others.220 This is the justification that has historically found the most
support in the work of presidential commissions,221 and it is the
justification for well-established compensation systems currently in
place in the United States. It “does not presuppose wrongful injury
[(there is no award of damages)], but is a matter of restitution and
restoration sometimes by the community as a whole . . . .”222
Compensatory justice takes “account of a previous state of affairs and
attempt[s] to restore a ‘fallen’ individual or group to it.”223
Compensatory justice also does not take into account the motivation
of the research participant when determining whether compensation is
owed.224 This is so because whether the participant enrolls for selfinterested or civic-minded reasons, the public benefit produced by the

217. See Himmelstein, supra note 176.
218. See Jonathan Gruber, Growth and Variability in Health Plan Premiums
in Insurance Market Before the Affordable Care Act, COMMONWEALTH
FUND
(June
5,
2014),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issuebriefs/2014/jun/health-insurance-premiums.
219. See, e.g., Johansson, supra note 46 (setting forth a comprehensive
scheme for compensating medical injuries through both treatment and
financial remedies).
220. James F. Childress, Compensating Injured Research Subjects: I. The
Moral Argument, 6(6) HASTINGS CENT. REP. 21, 22 (1976). See Henry et
al., supra note 115, at 12.
221. Henry, supra note 13, at 417.
222. Childress, supra note 220.
223. Id.
224. Id.

344

Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015
Defining Compensable Injury in Biomedical Research

advancement of medical science is the same.225 The results of the
research are similarly irrelevant to the question of compensation
because even studies that have negative results produce a social
benefit.226
The compensatory justice account of compensation for research
related injury provides a convincing rationale for existing programs
that provide benefits to individuals who are injured in the service of
society. 227 Two salient examples are the provision of benefits to
veterans and the creation of the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program (VICP).228 Veterans in the United States are
entitled to financial compensation for disabilities that are either
caused or aggravated by their military service.229 This benefit has
historically applied to both draftees and volunteers alike.230 The
VICP, on the other hand, compensates individuals who are injured
due to vaccination. The program provides compensation to
individuals harmed in the process of creating herd immunity through
widespread vaccination, which benefits to the public at large.231
Each of these programs is funded in a different manner, but they
have the same underlying ethical justification, namely, when
individuals have benefitted society and become injured in the process,
these systems work to spread the costs of compensating the injured
parties among the class of beneficiaries. Similarly, in research, science
and the development of new therapeutic treatments would not be able
to go forward without the participation of human research subjects.
With research comes an “ineliminable burden” of risk.232 Risks borne
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See id.
228. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL VACCINE
INJURY
COMPENSATION
PROGRAM,
http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/index.html (last visited Oct.
18, 2014). See also U.S. CT. OF FED. CLAIMS, VACCINE CLAIMS/OFFICE
OF
SPECIAL
MASTERS,
http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/vaccineprogramoffice-special-masters (last visited Oct. 18, 2014). See also
Childress, supra note 220.
DEP’T
OF
VETERANS’
AFFAIRS,
COMPENSATION,
229. See
U.S.
http://www.benefits.va.gov/COMPENSATION/types-compensation.asp
(last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
230. Childress, supra note 220.
231. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HUMAN RES. & SERVS. ADMIN.,
WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY
COMPENSATION
PROGRAM
(2011),
http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/84521booklet.pdf.
232. U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES,
supra note 16, at 59 (quoting Daniel Wikler & Mary Saltonstall,
Compensation for Research-Related Injury – Presentation to the PCSBI
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by research participants to benefit society at large should be both
minimized and distributed fairly.233 Compensation for research related
injury is a risk spreading mechanism because it forces society at large
to bear a portion of the cost of that risk of injury.234
While the obligation created by distributive and compensatory
justice is spread more broadly than the one created by the principle of
nonmaleficence, it demands less of each individual on whom it falls.235
A duty of this nature would be satisfied by some publicly funded
compensation system akin to veterans’ benefits or the VICP. A
compensation system that is based on a theory of distributive and
compensatory justice should therefore place at least some of the
burden of payment for research related injury on the public at large.
The burden of distributive and compensatory justice also falls
upon the shoulders of research sponsors and institutions to the extent
that these entities benefit financially or otherwise from the
commercialization of the products of biomedical research. Because
these entities reap a portion of the financial benefits of a new drug,
device, or intervention, they hold an obligation in distributive and
compensatory justice to the individuals who suffer a research related
injury.236
2. Reparative Justice

Reparative justice is based on the premise that a party that has
injured another is responsible for correcting or mitigating the harm
caused. Currently, compensation for research related injury is often
left to the legal system in the form of civil tort suits.237 This is a
classic embodiment of the principle of reparative justice because “[t]he
tort system requires injured research subjects to prove not only that
(Nov.
17,
2011),
available
at
http://bioethics.gov/sites/default/files/Meeting%207%20Session%208.pd
f.
233. See Henry, supra note 13, at 417-19.
234. See id.
235. See U.S. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS,
supra note 14, at 51, 56-57 (recognizing that an argument from the
principle of justice creates a relatively weak societal obligation).
236. See Resnik, supra note 143, at 282 (“Private sponsors benefit from the
profits they earn selling biomedical products, such as drugs or medical
devices. Research institutions benefit from the contracts and grants they
receive from private or government sponsors to conduct research, which
compensate institutions for the direct and indirect costs of doing
research . . . . Research subjects also often benefit from research,
because they may receive medical care or other therapy, educational
materials, or money. However, if a subject is injured in research, the
burdens for that subject may far outweigh the benefits.”).
237. See Pike, supra note 24, at 23.
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the research study caused their injury, but that fault for the injury
lies with the research team, pharmaceutical company, or institutional
sponsor.”238 While the reparative justice framework provides an
adequate justification for compensation where the research participant
has been harmed because of some sort of misconduct by the sponsor,
institution, or researcher, it does not address the issue of
compensation where a research related injury is not the product of
negligence or an intentional tort.239 Given the uncertainty inherent in
conducting research on novel medical interventions or strategies, or
applications of existing interventions or strategies, injuries will occur
in research even when sponsors and researchers do nothing wrong.240
Such injuries do not create a claim in reparative justice and are not
susceptible to redress through the tort system.241 Claims that are
based in negligence or malfeasance should be channeled into the tort
system for appropriate redress, but claims that are not the product of
wrongful action ought to be dealt with through an alternative no-fault
compensation system.
C. Pragmatic Reasons for Compensating Research Related Injuries

In addition to the ethical reasons for providing compensation for
research related injuries, there are also practical benefits. In
particular, compensation could have the positive effect of increasing
enrollment in human subjects research.242 Research is necessary for the
advancement of medical treatment and care, and even studies that do
not produce positive outcomes or results contribute to the knowledge
base available to future researchers.243 Compensation for research
related injury gives participation in any given study a more favorable
personal risk-benefit profile and may remove one large disincentive to
participation—the possibility of having to pay for medical
treatment.244 A uniform policy favoring compensation would also have
the benefit of harmonizing the different compensation policies
currently in existence and providing research subjects with a universal

238. Henry, supra note 13, at 413.
239. See id.
240. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 151, at 155.
241. Pike, supra note 24, at 29.
242. See U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N
supra note 16, at 61.

FOR THE

243. See U.S. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION
PROBLEMS, supra note 14, at 8-9.
244. See U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N
supra note 16, at 61-62.
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baseline level of protection that does not depend on the location of
the study.245
As Alex John London has observed, “research is an enterprise
that uses social resources to provide social benefits.”246 London argues
that public confidence in research is reduced when the problems of
“antipathy, disrespect, lack of social value, or unfair division of social
resources” arise in the research process.247 In particular, antipathy, as
used by London, “refers to a manifest lack of concern for the health,
welfare, and broader interests of research participants.”248 By failing
to provide compensation for research related injuries, the current
research enterprise exhibits just such antipathy toward the individuals
who volunteer to become research subjects. Creation of a national nofault compensation system might, therefore, have the added benefit of
fostering public support for the continuation of the research
enterprise.249
D. Application

As demonstrated above, the justifications for compensating
subjects for research related injuries place the duty to provide
compensation on different actors. The principles of nonmaleficence
and reparative justice place the duty at the feet of the research
sponsors, institutions, and investigators. By contrast, the principles of
distributive and compensatory justice place the duty on the
beneficiaries of the research, be that either society at large or the
research sponsors and institutions that stand to profit from the
eventual commercialization of any knowledge gained by the research
enterprise. A compensation system can be designed to allocate the
primary burden of compensation among different potential duty
bearers. It need not, however, always stay there. Primary duty
bearers may distribute the duty among other potential duty bearers.
For example, if sponsors are responsible for providing compensation,
the cost of that compensation may be built in to the market price of
the therapeutic intervention that the research helped to produce. If
research institutions are responsible, the cost may be built in to the
charges they pass on to sponsors (and thus distributed to the public

245. Id. at 62.
246. Alex John London, A Non-Paternalistic Model of Research Ethics and
Oversight: Assessing the Benefits of Prospective Review, 40 J. LAW.
MED. ETHICS 930, 943 (2012).
247. Id. at 933.
248. Id.
249. See, e.g., id. at 935 (arguing that “[a] tipping point is reached when the
reservoir of public trust is significantly diminished and social support for
the research enterprise is called into question or revoked.”).
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through the pricing of any intervention), or incorporated in the cost
of receiving medical care at that institution.
In light of the multiple ways that the burden of compensation
could be distributed, any framework for compensation should
incorporate consideration of the justifications for compensation and
where those justifications place the duty to compensate. Reparative
justice, when it applies, provides the strongest justification for
compensating research related injuries. It is a foundational principle of
the tort system and a widely accepted principle in law and ethics that
one who wrongfully injures another has an obligation to make that
person whole.250 Cases in which reparative justice requires
compensation are, however, relatively rare because the injured party
must prove that the injury was wrongful.251 A wrongful injury is one
that is the product of a culpable state of mind—negligence,
recklessness, or intent—on the part of the one who causes the injury.
These cases are appropriately dealt with through the tort system,
which is designed to provide a mechanism for those who have been
wronged to seek monetary damages from the one who wronged
them.252 Any duty to compensate based in reparative justice,
therefore, should not be dealt with in a new compensation system, but
would be better handled by reforms to the existing tort framework.
A recent article enumerates the many barriers to compensation
for research related injury under the current tort law framework.253 It
argues that the tort system “is an unsatisfactory compensation
mechanism for almost all litigants” because it “is time-consuming,
adversarial, expensive, and has a tendency to under-compensate most
injured participants while over-compensating a select few.”254 Injured
research participants face high barriers to recovery due to lack of
established case law and difficulty proving a breach of a legal duty
owed to them or that the research intervention caused their injury.255
Participants in federally conducted research or international research
face additional statutory barriers to recovery.256 The net result is that
“[u]nder the current negligence approach, only an extremely limited
250. See, e.g., Pike, supra note 24, at 19.
251. See London, supra note 246, at 23.
252. See id. (arguing that continued reliance on the tort system as the sole
means of compensation for research related injuries is morally
indefensible because, among other reasons, it requires wrongful injury
which is often either contrary to the facts of the research related injury
or unable to be proven).
253. Id. at 26.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See id. at 29-38.
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subset of injured research participants can bring a successful tort
lawsuit: those who were injured in research that did not comply with
federal regulations, when the injury arose due to the researchers fault,
and in jurisdictions where research participants are not precluded
from recovering by a signed informed consent document.”257
While those who are able to bring a successful suit under the
current tort law framework have a clear claim to compensation in
reparative justice, the scope of the reparative justice obligation is
broader than what the current tort law framework allows. In order to
match the scope of the obligation, the tort framework would need to
undergo reforms, including removing some of the current barriers to
suit in research related injury cases.258 The tort system would then
provide an adequate means of dealing with those cases where a
research subject has been wrongfully injured due to some culpable act
of a researcher, institution, or sponsor. The vast majority of research
injuries where there is no culpable conduct cannot, however, be
adequately accommodated under a tort law framework and should,
instead, be subject to some form of no-fault compensation.259
In contrast to the limited scope of reparative justice,
nonmaleficence provides a compelling justification for providing
compensation for research related injuries in the majority of cases.
Nonmaleficence, grounded in the relationship between sponsors,
researchers, institutions, and subjects, is intertwined with the
obligations already undertaken by sponsors, researchers, and
institutions in other parts of the research enterprise. For example, the
duty to minimize risks is incorporated into IRB review of research
protocols, and the requirement that a protocol must be scientifically
valid. There is no morally justified reason for the obligation to
minimize risks to end with prospective physical or medical risks and
not include the financial risks of research related injury. Furthermore,
the relationship between the sponsors, institutions, researchers and
subjects gives weight to a duty to act.260 Finally, nonmaleficence
257. Id. at 29.
258. For examples of current barriers see Pike, supra note 24, at 33.
259. See id. at 44; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, supra
note 27, at III-1; Responsible Research: A Systems Approach to
Protecting
Research
Participants,
INST.
OF
MED.,
http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2002/Responsible-Research-A-SystemsApproach-to-Protecting-Research-Participants.aspx (last visited May 5,
2014).
260. An analogy can be drawn here to tort law, where in the absence of some
relationship between the person in peril and the potential rescuer, there
is no duty to rescue. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON TORTS, 375 (5th ed. 1984) (“Because of . . . reluctance to
countenance ‘nonfeasance’ as a basis of liability, the law has persistently
refused to impose on a stranger the moral obligation of common
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creates a strong obligation to act because the ones who bear the duty
are also those who are in a position to either mitigate or exacerbate
harm and risk of harm to the participant during his or her enrollment
in research.
In examining the principles underlying an obligation to provide
compensation for research related injury, nonmaleficence and justice
create complementary duties for sponsors, institutions, and
researchers. In particular, sponsors, institutions, and researchers have
a strong duty to compensate participants under a reparative justice
model when they have caused the injury. Similarly, those entities
have a well-founded duty to provide compensation under a theory of
distributive and compensatory justice because they benefit financially
and professionally from the participants’ enrollment in research.261
Although sponsors, institutions, and researchers generally have a
vested interest in any given trial, assessing the total benefit of
research to these actors is a complex task. After all, a trial may fail,
giving no direct benefits to the sponsor, institution, or researcher
involved, but providing information that may be useful to others
involved in the research enterprise at some future time. At this point,
it is sufficient to recognize that these actors have a definite stake in
the continuation of research, but that the benefit to them may vary in
degree based on many factors, including, but not limited to the type
of actor and the outcome of the research.262
The duty of the general public, grounded in both distributive and
compensatory justice, is difficult to compare with the duties held by
sponsors, institutions, and researchers because the benefits accruing to
each party are largely incommensurable.263 Commercial sponsors of
humanity to go to the aid of another human being who is in danger,
even if the other is in danger of losing his life.”).
261. See Resnik, supra note 138, at 266, 269. Financial benefit is the more
important metric here because this article is chiefly concerned with
monetary compensation for economic harms, including, but not limited
to, the cost of care and of lost wages due to disability. See also
Childress, supra note 220.
262. Compare Listing Revenues and Profits for Major Pharmaceutical
FORTUNE
500,
available
at
Companies,
FORBES
http://fortune.com/fortune500/2013/wal-mart-stores-inc-1 (last accessed
Mar. 19, 2015), with Matthew Herper, How Much Does Pharmaceutical
Innovation
Cost?,
FORBES
(Aug.
11,
2013)
available
at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2013/08/11/the-cost-ofinventing-a-new-drug-98-companies-ranked
(calculating
estimated
research and development costs per drug over the past ten years for one
hundred pharmaceutical companies). In sum, the benefit that any
individual sponsor, institution, or researcher reaps from research will be
contingent upon the projects that they have invested in.
263. It is extremely difficult to objectively compare the value of a drug or
intervention to the manufacturer (in terms of profits) with the value of
that same intervention to an institution, which may benefit through
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the device, drug, or intervention receive a large portion of the benefit
generated, namely the profits. Public or non-profit sponsors may
receive a lesser financial benefit, but they may gain other rewards
from research, such as reputational gains and the satisfaction of seeing
progress made in the area the sponsor chooses to focus on. Similarly,
research institutions and researchers receive benefits from biomedical
research—namely funding and prestige—which are less easily
measured than pure financial benefits. These types of actors have a
large stake in any given project, as well as an undeniable interest in
seeing the continuation of the research enterprise. The public at large
benefits immensely from the existence of the research enterprise as a
whole, but public benefit is not necessarily contingent upon the
success of any particular study.264 As Alan Wertheimer has eloquently
stated in response to Hans Jonas’s famous claim that progress is
optional, “one person’s ‘optional progress’ is another person’s life or
body.”265 The research enterprise produces a vast social good because
it transforms yesterday’s experimental drugs, devices, and
interventions into today’s standard therapies.266 It is difficult to
compare the value of a drug to an individual whose life it saves with
the value of that same drug to the company that reaps the profits. It
can, nonetheless, be determined that the public as a whole receives
great benefit from research and should therefore, under a theory of
compensatory justice, bear some of the burden of compensation for
research related injuries.
The benefits of the research enterprise are spread widely across a
number of actors who have varying degrees of obligation to
compensate the individuals who have been injured during the research
process. In light of the different obligations created, a compensation
system guided by the principles of nonmaleficence and justice should
take into account the many beneficiaries of research, and spread the
burden of compensation accordingly. Such a model should have the
cost of compensation borne by all those with a stake in the research
enterprise including sponsors (both private and public), institutions,
researchers, and, of course, the public at large.

growth and prestige, or with the benefit of the same intervention to an
individual whose quality of life is improved.
264. Rid & Wendler, supra note 21, at 145. See also Childress, supra note
220.
265. ALAN WERTHEIMER, RETHINKING
WIDENING THE LENS 12 (2010).
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III. Using Ethical Justifications to Define
“Compensable Injury”
A. Causation

All justifications for compensation of research related injury
incorporate a requirement of causation. A duty of risk-minimization
based in nonmaleficence requires compensation only for those injuries
that foreseeably arise as part of the research process.267 The
justification for this approach is that the duty bearers within the
research enterprise cannot be held responsible for risks outside of
those that they have an obligation to minimize.268 This requires that
compensation be limited to those injuries that are caused by the
subject’s participation in research.269 Similarly, a duty based in
distributive and compensatory justice requires compensation for those
injuries occasioned by the research participant’s decision to
participate in biomedical research, thereby foregoing the standard of
care.270 It is this decision that produces the benefits of medical
research and scientific progress that are received by both the research
enterprise and society as a whole.271 Injuries that can be traced back
to that decision should be compensated as research related injuries.
Finally, the duty of reparative justice requires compensation for those
injuries that have been caused by the negligence or malfeasance of
someone within the research enterprise.272
The path that causation must tread in these cases is analogous to
that required by courts in evaluating claims of negligence.273 As
illustrated above, different international systems of compensation

267. See, e.g., Joffe & Miller, supra note 21, at 36; see also U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, supra note 27, at 10 (noting the broad
foreseeability of research related injuries and citing that as a reason that
might bar recovery in tort).
268. See supra Part II.
269. This might also place policy based limits on what injuries caused by
research should be compensable—for example, risks that are of the type
research sponsors, researchers and institutions are well equipped to
guard against might be outside of the scope of responsibility, for
example, a car accident on the way to the research clinic. Limits of this
type were once contained under the heading of proximate cause, but are
more appropriately addressed as limitations on the scope of
responsibility. See, e.g. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. &
EMOT. HARM ch. 6, spec. note (2010).
270. See supra Part II.
271. See supra Part II.
272. See supra Part II.
273. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION
ed. 1985).
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require different proof of causation when it comes to research related
injuries. In order to more clearly determine what it means for an
injury to be caused by research, it is necessary to look at theories of
causation more broadly and to examine causation in the research
context. In particular, causation cannot be isolated from an analysis
of whether participants received the appropriate standard of care. In
so-called therapeutic research, it is often difficult to determine
whether a patient-subject’s worsening condition is the result of a
research related injury or of the natural progression of the individual’s
underlying disease state.274 These considerations must be incorporated
into a comprehensive system for determining which injuries can
justifiably be said to have been caused by the research.
1. A Theory of Causation

The concept of causation is deceptively difficult. Although the
language that is used when discussing causation is both intuitive and
intended to be interpreted by lay people, an analysis of causation as it
is used in the law leads to complex questions about both the origin
and the attribution of events. At this point, it is useful to draw upon
the work of H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré, who have undertaken a
thorough examination of causation in the law.275 Their analysis of
causation aims to explicate what separates a cause from a mere
condition of the occurrence of an event, and it also explores the
conditions under which the determination that an event is the cause
of another leads to an attribution of responsibility for the
consequences of that event.
a. Causes and Conditions

Causes, as they are used in the legal or historical lexicon, must be
distinguished from the causal concepts used by scientists and
philosophers.276 In general, lawyers are concerned with the attribution
of responsibility for the consequences of an action.277 Hart and Honoré
draw upon the work of Hume and Mill to conclude that for any given
occurrence, a number of factors are necessary to produce the ultimate
274. See Henry et al., supra note 115, at 5. (“[P]roving causation is
problematic for research participants, many of whom suffer from
underlying medical conditions that make it difficult to determine
whether their alleged injury is the result of the experimental
intervention or their disease.”).
275. See generally HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273.
276. Id. at 17-20.
277. Id. at 20. (“[T]he lawyer, the historian, and the plain man accept the
doctrine that an event of a given kind may be produced by different
causes. They are perfectly prepared to treat, for example, death, as
caused by poisoning, sometimes by starvation, and sometimes by
shooting . . . .”)
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effect.278 They therefore argue that “when we identify single events as
causes it appears that we choose one element from such a set,
although each of the members of the set is equally required for the
production of the effect.”279 A classic example is the case of
determining the cause of a fire when a lighted match was dropped
into a wastepaper basket. It is intuitive to say that the lighted match
caused the fire, even though the presence of oxygen was also a
necessary background condition.280
The natural question presented is, therefore, what separates an
element that is considered to be a “cause” from other factors
necessary to produce the effect?281 One explanation is that a cause “is
an interference in the natural course of events which makes a
difference in the way these develop.”282 This definition is particularly
useful for “simple cases” where an individual produces “some desired
effect by manipulation of an object in [the] environment.”283
One important feature of this approach is that it takes into
account the normal background conditions in which a cause operates.
It rests on a “presumption, normally fulfilled but rebuttable, that
when we deliberately intervene in nature to bring about effects which
in fact supervene, no other explanation of their occurrence is to be
found.”284 Normal conditions are those that are present both in the
ordinary functioning of the item or process in question, and in the
case of an accident or mishap.285 They are therefore ruled out as a

278. Id. at 17.
279. Id.
280. The Restatement (Third) of Torts largely adopts Hart and Honoré’s
view with the exception that it does not distinguish between causes and
conditions, but rather considers all conditions necessary for the
occurrence of an event to be “causes.” Causes are then divided into
“relevant causes” (those brought about by tortious conduct) and
“background causes.” Tortious conduct must only be a cause of harm in
order for liability to follow. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. &
EMOT. HARM § 26 cmt. (d) & Reporter’s Note (2010). Because the
language used in the restatement may prove confusing in a non-legal
context where there is often no tortious conduct, this article relies upon
the more traditional language which distinguishes causes of an event
from conditions for its occurrence.
281. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 17.
282. Id. at 29. This should be distinguished from the “substantial factor”
test, which has been soundly rejected by RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 26 cmt. (j) (2010), and regarded as a
further exploration of the concept of factual causation.
283. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 29.
284. Id. at 32.
285. Id. at 34.
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cause of any particular accident.286 “[N]ormal conditions (and hence in
causal inquiries mere conditions) are those conditions which are
present as part of the usual state or mode of operation of the thing
under inquiry.”287 For example, when considering what caused a train
accident, a bent rail is likely to be considered a cause, because it,
rather than the speed and weight of the train operating as usual,
made the difference between the train’s normal functioning and its
derailment.288 This is the case even though the crash would not have
occurred as it did if the train were not traveling at that speed or if it
did not have the same weight.289
Causal definition in this manner is particularly useful in the
research context. To begin with, it supports the proposition that
participation in research must be a cause in fact, or sine qua non, of a
research related injury.290 It also tells us, however, that the inquiry
must not stop there. To say that an injury would not have occurred
but for the subject’s participation in research only identifies research
as one of the background conditions that was necessary for the injury
to occur. It does not pluck it out from among those conditions and
identify it as a cause of the injury.291 This definition, without more,
would not rule out compensation for injuries that, for example, occur
due to traffic accidents on the way to the research clinic.292 In order to
identify research participation as the cause of the injury, it is
therefore necessary to determine what research activity has caused a
deviation from the normal conditions that otherwise would have
prevailed.
This definition excludes the natural progression of a
patient/participant’s illness as a cause of a research related injury if
the illness would have progressed regardless of the individual’s
participation in research. For example, imagine the case of an
individual with advanced cancer, for whom all standard treatments
have failed. This individual’s prognosis is poor, and death is likely to
occur. Because death is the expected outcome for this participant, due
to the natural progression of his or her disease, failure of a clinical
286. Id.
287. Id. at 35.
288. Id. at 34.
289. See id.
290. See id. at 17.
291. See, e.g., id. at 17, 34.
292. Such injuries should be ruled out because, in those cases, there is
another primary duty bearer, namely the motorist who injured the
research subject, and also because they are not the types of injury that
a compensation scheme is designed to protect against. See supra note
269 on scope of liability.
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trial intervention to avert that outcome is not a change in the normal
operating conditions that will make a difference in the way those
conditions develop. The search for a cause, as distinguished from a
mere condition for the occurrence of an injury, should also guide the
search for an explanation for any given injury.
What counts as a normal condition for a particular occurrence
may often be the product of human habit, custom, or convention.293
This observation is of particular importance in the medical context
because, with the knowledge that some conditions are harmful in the
absence of human intervention and are commonly ameliorated with
appropriate medical attention, it becomes the normal state of affairs
to intervene, and the lack of intervention is therefore a deviation from
the normal course of events.294 An example is helpful to understand
how this principle operates in practice. Imagine that Ms. Smith has
been diagnosed with pneumonia. In the ordinary course of events, it is
known that prompt treatment with antibiotics is generally curative,
and that in the absence of treatment, the pneumonia may become
significantly worse.295 In this case, it could be said that the failure to
treat Ms. Smith’s pneumonia was the cause of the advancement of her
disease and her ultimate death.
b. Causes and Human Action

In identifying a cause of an event, special importance is given to
voluntary human action. It “is often regarded both as a limit [on how
far back we trace the chain of causation] and also as still a cause even
though other later abnormal occurrences have provisionally been
recognized as causes.”296 An ordinary causal inquiry, in which we are
seeking to explain an occurrence, will not ordinarily be traced
“through a deliberate act.”297 Abnormal consequences that follow a
deliberate act are also likely to be regarded as mere means by which
the act reaches its natural end.298 A deliberate human act is therefore
a natural boundary for the causal inquiry. We do not trace the path
of a later event back through it, and we pass through intermediate
causes of other kinds on our way to it.299

293. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 37.
294. See, e.g., id.
295. How is Pneumonia Treated?, NAT’L HEART, LUNG & BLOOD INST.,
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/healthtopics/topics/pnu/treatment.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2014).
296. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 42.
297. Id. at 43.
298. See id.
299. See id. at 44.
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Our inquiry thus far should lead to the conclusion that a cause
will differ from other necessary circumstances for the occurrence of a
later event because it will be an abnormal condition, and it will often
be brought about by a deliberate human action. A cause, once
identified, should also be unproblematically connected to the
consequences or effect it produced.300 This means that it should fit
within the broad generalizations about what types of action produce
what types of effects, and it should also fit within the framework of
past cases.301
The causal inquiry we seek to enter into in the research related
injury context has both explanatory and attributive aspects.302 In
asking what caused a particular research injury, an explanation is
sought for the origin of the injury, and the question is asked as to
who, if anyone, should be held responsible for the damage. In linking
a consequence to its cause, we encounter a number of intervening
factors and conditions, some of “which are not only subsequent to,
but independent of the initiating action or event.”303 Imagine, for
example, a participant who is sickened by the administration of the
trial medication and is likely to die, but before the drug can have that
effect, an old enemy, not knowing this is the case, stabs him to death.
In assessing these intermediate factors, the mere background
“conditions in or on which the cause operates” must be distinguished
from those factors that may break the chain of causation.304
Conditions are often separated from intervening causes by an analogy
with the case of simple actions. In the usual case, a voluntary human
action, which follows the initial “cause,” will break the proverbial
causal chain. It is an intervention through which the cause is not
traced.305 In the example above, the administration of the trial drug
could be said to have made the participant ill, but it was not the
cause of his death; rather, the causal link was broken by the
deliberate action of a third party. This case is contrasted with
“actions which in any of a variety of different ways are less than fully
voluntary,” and which “are assimilated to the means by which or the
circumstances in which the earlier action brings about the

300. See id. at 46.
301. Id. at 46-47.
302. See id. at 73.
303. Id. at 72.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 75 (explaining that this rule does not hold “where an opportunity
commonly exploited for harmful action is negligently provided, or one
person intentionally provides another with the means, the opportunity,
or a certain type of reason for wrongdoing.”).
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consequences.”306 Similarly, the causal chain is broken by the
occurrence of coincidences, so long as the coincidence was not
contrived or intended by the initial actor (i.e. if our unfortunate
research subject was killed by a falling tree branch rather than
another person).307 A cause will not be broken, however, by an
abnormal state of the thing acted upon at the time that the act
occurs. For example, if an individual (A) hits another (B), and it
turns out that B had the proverbial “eggshell skull” and is killed by
the blow, it would be said that A has caused B’s death even though B
was unusually susceptible to harm and an ordinary person without
that condition would not have been killed by a blow of the type that
A delivered. Such a preexisting condition is merely “part of the
circumstances in which the cause ‘operates.’”308
In seeking to explain the cause of an injury that occurs during
research, it is necessary to trace the chain of events leading up to an
injury back to the point where an abnormal occurrence disturbed
what would otherwise have been the normal order of things.
Voluntary human action is a particularly salient disturbance because
we generally operate on the premise that voluntary conduct has the
potential to alter the world in which it operates. Therefore, in tracing
back the causal chain leading to an injury in the research setting,
special attention should be paid to whether a human intervention
(such as the taking of blood, administration of a novel drug, or
performance of a medical procedure) is included in the chain of
causation. Application of Hart and Honoré’s analysis to the research
context also counsels that biological differences in research subjects
that may make them more or less susceptible to injury should not be
weighed in determining whether research participation truly was the
cause of the injury.309 The relationship between human action and
causation does not counsel that all injuries following a research
intervention are research related, but rather provides a useful
guidepost for the causal question.
A second and related question will be whether this human
intervention was performed for the purpose of furthering the aims of
306. Id.
307. Id. at 78 (“We speak of a coincidence whenever the conjunction of two
or more events in certain spatial or temporal relations (1) is very
unlikely by ordinary standards and (2) is for some reason significant or
important, provided (3) that they occur without human contrivance and
(4) are independent of each other.”).
308. Id. at 80.
309. Of course, such considerations may need to be taken into account when
determining whether certain potential participants should be excluded
from research participation on the grounds of increased risk. See Dave
Wendler, When Should “Riskier” Subjects Be Excluded From Research
Participation?, 8 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 307, 307 (1998).
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research, or whether it was part of ordinary or concomitant medical
care. This is addressed below in the context of the relationship
between causation and the standard of care. It is not a causal inquiry
in and of itself, but rather a baseline determination of whether the
event that caused the injury was itself research related. By following
this two-step process, the inquirer first determines whether an
intervention was a cause of an injury, and next determines whether
that intervention was research related.
c. Causes and Principles of Policy310

What is described as a cause “may have features which vary from
context to context,” there may be “different types of causal inquiry,”
and “there may not be a single concept of causation but rather a
cluster of related concepts.”311 Hart and Honoré have noted that there
is an insistence in the modern critiques of the concept of causation
that, “where the existence or the extent of liability for the violation of
statute is in issue, a range of problems, which appear insoluble if
considered in causal terms are relatively easily solved if viewed as
questions concerning the scope or purpose of the statute, or the
nature of the interests it was designed to protect.”312 While Hart and
Honoré do not endorse the modern critique in its entirety, they do
acknowledge that the concept of policy limitations on causation has a
proper place in an analysis of causation in the law. Limitations on
causation may therefore be created not only by legal principles of
causation, but also by “special principles of policy.”313
Such principles of policy are often introduced by way of analysis
of foreseeability and risk. These concepts are balanced somewhat
precariously on the border between truly causal questions and
limitations on causation that are set as a matter of policy.314 The
foreseeability and risk doctrines aim to address the proper scope of
the causal inquiry and provide a formula for determining when
attribution of responsibility for an event is appropriate. Foreseeability
310. Hart and Honoré preceded the Restatement (Third) of Torts in
identifying proximate cause not as a type of cause, but rather as a
principle of policy more appropriately addressed (as it is in the latest
edition of the restatement) as dealing with the “scope of liability.” See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 26 cmt. (a) &
Reporter’s Note (2010).
311. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 19.
312. Id. at 102.
313. Id. at 93.
314. Id. (“A legal system may mark more or less strongly and in various
ways the distinction between the limits on liability imposed by
principles of causation and those imposed by special principles of
policy[.]”).
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may either limit or expand the scope of the causal inquiry.315 In its
limiting form, it holds that “only foreseeable harm is recoverable,”
which serves to remove responsibility from the defendant for effects of
his conduct that would not be predictable to the ordinary man at the
time of its undertaking.316 In its expansive form, foreseeability requires
that all foreseeable harm, for which the defendant’s act was a
necessary condition, be recoverable.317 In practice, the concept of
foreseeability has not been uniformly applied, and it often fails to
adequately address questions where both an explanation and an
attribution of cause are sought.318 Risk theory, by contrast, asks who
should bear the risk of a particular injury.319 That determination is
based in policy, and the answer may vary depending on the
justification put forth. Risk theory, like foreseeability, both extends
and restricts the attribution of consequences; however, unlike
foreseeability, risk theory does so by restricting liability to “those
types of harm the chance or risk of which formed the reason or a
reason for the imposition of liability.”320
Although foreseeability seems like a logical fit for the research
context with its focus on prospective risk mitigation, risk theory is
particularly applicable to the problem of compensation for research
related injuries. The justification for requiring compensation in these
cases is often not rooted in negligence, but in a considered
determination of who, all things considered, ought to bear the risk of
injury.321 It flows from that determination that recovery should be
limited to those types of harm that are justified by that allocation
determination. Within that limitation, however, a risk theory analysis
would be incomplete without reference to causal concepts.322 Risk
theory is most useful here to set an outer limit on the causal inquiry
so that compensation is provided when the injury is caused by
research and when it is within the risks that led to the imposition of a
compensation obligation in the first place.323 Such a limitation serves
315. See id. at 258. The foreseeability inquiry can also be framed as one of
proximate cause or scope of liability. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM ch. 6, spec. note (2010).
316. See id. at 263, 275.
317. Id. at 275.
318. See id. at 284.
319. Id. at 285.
320. Id. at 86.
321. See supra Part II.
322. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 285.
323. This can also be thought about in terms of defining the scope of
liability. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM
ch. 6 spec. note (2010).
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the purpose of ensuring that the law as implemented is in line with
the justifications for imposing a compensation requirement in the
absence of culpable conduct.
Finally, it should be noted that causation, as a concept in the
law, cannot be entirely divorced from notions associated with moral
responsibility. In general, “to say that someone is responsible for some
harm means that in accordance with legal rules or moral principles it
is at least permissible, if not mandatory, to blame or punish or exact
compensation from him.”324 It is not true however that such a
correlation is present in all cases. The law is well within its purview
to draw a line around illegal conduct that is different from the
common morality.325 It is therefore the case that moral blame is
neither necessary nor sufficient for legal responsibility.326 In some
cases, however, it is desirable to draft a law that best matches the
ethical obligations of the regulated parties so that the values
embodied in the law mirror those of the common morality.327 This is
particularly the case in the regulation of biomedical research, which
has its own field dedicated to the analysis of what constitutes the
proper ethical conduct of research activities.328 In part due to the
evolving understanding of the ethics of clinical research, the law has
attempted to mirror the ethical obligations of the parties involved in
order to promote a balance between protecting the interests of
research participants and allowing for the advancement of medical
science.329
Policy considerations can and should guide the development of
the scope of responsibility within which causal concepts operate in
compensation systems for research related injury.330 Experience
demonstrates that when cause is defined too broadly or not limited in
scope, it can have a damaging effect on the research enterprise.331 This
324. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 65.
325. See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On
Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 650-51
(1984).
326. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 67.
327. See, e.g., id. at 66. See also Dan-Cohen, supra note 325, at 650-51.
328. See Emanuel et al., supra note 156, at 2701.
329. See, e.g., London, supra note 246. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On
the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996)
(discussing the law’s tendency to not only reflect but also fortify social
norms).
330. In the past, this idea has been associated with the concept of proximate
cause. It is akin to scope of liability as laid out in the Restatement
(Third) of Torts, supra note 310.
331. See Kripa Mahalingam, Critical Condition, OUTLOOK BUSINESS (Mar. 1,
2014), http://business.outlookindia.com/article_v3.aspx?artid=289527.
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was the case when India first introduced its new requirements for
compensation of research related injuries, and it resulted in numerous
companies either pausing or withdrawing from research in India.332
The scope of responsibility should not be defined so broadly that it
prevents the biomedical research enterprise from performing its core
function, namely the development of novel therapies and devices for
treatment of medical conditions. There is a delicate balance to be
struck between the moral claims of injured research subjects and the
social benefit produced by the continuation of the research enterprise.
It is therefore advisable to use policy as a tool to limit the reach of
causation when necessary to protect countervailing social concerns.
2. A Theory of Causation for Research Related Injuries: The Positive
Case

In light of the above discussion, it is possible to put forth a
positive account of what it means for an injury to have been caused
by research. To begin with the most basic elements of causation, it
must first be the case that the subject’s participation in research is a
cause in fact of the injury—in other words, that the injury would not
have occurred but for the decision to enter into research. Next, a
research intervention must create a condition that differs from the
normal course of events, and that condition must lead (sometimes
through a series of events) to the injury. This definition includes
injuries due to administration of the study intervention and injuries
incurred due to performance of medical procedures that are necessary
for research, but are not clinically indicated.333
Injuries that are due to the natural progression of the
participant’s illness and those injuries that result from the
participant’s deviation from the research protocol are excluded
332. Id.
333. It should be noted that this proposed definition tracks closely with that
provided by HEW SECY’S TASK FORCE ON THE COMP. OF INJURED
RESEARCH SUBJECTS, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE,
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE II-2 (1977) [hereinafter SECY’S TASK
FORCE], which stated that human subjects who suffer physical,
psychological, or social injury in the course of research conducted or
supported by the PHS should be compensated if (1) the injury is
proximately caused by such research, and (2) the injury on balance
exceeds that reasonably associated with such illness from which the
subject may be suffering, as well as with treatment usually associated
with such illness at the time the subject began participation in the
research. The definition proposed here is different because it relies on a
more robust theory of causation that is tailored to the research context
and limits the types of injuries considered (see infra). These changes are
supported by the experience of the international community in
confronting this topic (see supra Part I.A) and by the fact that the
locus of responsibility under this proposal is not being placed upon the
federal government, as the 1977 task force recommended.

363

Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015
Defining Compensable Injury in Biomedical Research

because in those cases the research intervention cannot be identified
as a cause among the many conditions that were necessary for the
injury to occur.334 When a research intervention is one of multiple
causes of an injury, reduction in the amount of compensation may be
appropriate.335 The reduction in compensation should be proportionate
to the contribution of the various causes (if that could be determined)
and it should also reflect the fact that not all of the harm can be said
to have been caused by research related interventions. Risk theory
may provide some guidance in borderline cases because it allows
consideration of which party ought to bear the risk of injury to come
into the decision-making process when deciding whether compensation
is owed. In practice, this should mean that in borderline cases, the
evidence should be interpreted leniently in favor of the injured
subject.336
3. Intersection of Causation with the Standard of Care: The Negative
Case

A second question that arises when attempting to determine
whether an individual has suffered a research related injury is in what
cases an omission can be said to be the cause of a research related
injury. An omission in this case is best defined as the failure to
provide medically indicated treatment for the participant-subject’s
underlying disease or condition. A clinical trial operates against the
background of the de facto standard of care in the host nation.337 The
de facto standard of care is one in “which the standards of medical
practice for a community are set by the actual medical practices of
that community.”338 In general, when an individual enters a clinical
334. This is under the theory of contributory negligence. True, the research
participation creates an opportunity for the injury to occur, but it is the
participant’s negligent conduct that causes the injury, whereas if the
participant had followed the protocol, the injury would not have
occurred. There may be an exception to this principle available if the
participant can demonstrate that the burden of compliance was
unreasonably high, but this is not likely because the participant should
have been able to judge, when entering the research, whether
compliance would be feasible. All responsibility in these cases cannot
and should not be placed on individuals other than the patient.
335. See HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 180.
336. Henry et al., supra note 115, at 10-11. This is similar to giving the
participants the benefit of the doubt when determining whether an
injury was research related.
337. See Alex John London, The Ambiguity and the Exigency: Clarifying
“Standard of Care” Arguments in International Research, 25 J. MED. &
Phil. 379, 382 (2000) (defining the de facto standard of care as the local
standard of actual medical practice).
338. Id. London also illustrates that this can be distinguished from the “de
jure” standard of care which is set not by actual practice, but “by the
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trial, he or she faces a choice between trial participation and seeking
standard of care treatment in the community.339 In practice, this
choice may be constrained on an individual basis by a number of
factors including the availability of medical care in the community,
the individual’s financial resources, and the success that the
individual has had with other treatments, if such treatments have
previously been tried. It is intuitive to think that an individual, on
account of his or her greater financial resources, may have access to a
better standard of care than is generally available locally, but for the
majority of research participants this will not be the case.
If the individual chooses to participate in research, he or she
might receive the study intervention or be placed in the control arm.
The control arm is the standard against which the new intervention is
tested.340 There is currently a robust debate as to what standard of
care must be provided in the control arm of international clinical
trials, and whether it is ever acceptable to provide less than the best
available standard of care.341 It has been convincingly argued,
however, that it may be appropriate for a study to test an
intervention against less than the best available standard of care
where four criteria are met: (1) scientific necessity, (2) host
community relevance, (3) sufficient host community benefit, and (4)
subject and host community non-maleficence.342 Under these criteria,
there is substantial room for difference between research projects as to
what may ethically be used as a control.343 The question then
judgment of experts in the medical community as to which diagnostic
and therapeutic practices have proven most effective against the illness
in question.” Id. at 384.
339. See, e.g., David Wendler et al., The Standard of Care Debate: Can
Research in Developing Countries Be Both Ethical and Responsive to
Those Countries’ Health Needs?, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 923, 924
(2004) (describing short course AZT trials and the decision faced by
participants of receiving the trial intervention or a placebo, which was
consistent with the care that would have been available in the
community outside of the research setting).
340. See id.
341. See London, supra note 337. See also Wendler et al., supra note 339.
342. Wendler et al., supra note 339, at 927. The authors define those terms
as follows: “(1) scientific necessity: investigators must use less than the
worldwide best methods to answer the scientific question posed by the
trial; (2) relevance for the host community: answering the scientific
question posed by the trial will help address an important health need of
the host community; (3) sufficient host community benefit: the trial will
produce a fair level of benefit for the host community; and (4) subject
and host community nonmaleficence: subjects and the host community
will not be made prospectively worse off than they would be in the
absence of the trial.”
343. See id.
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presented by the standard of care debate is under what circumstances
injuries resulting from randomization to the control arm of a clinical
trial can be counted as an injury that is caused by research
participation.
As was noted above, something is the cause of a later event where
it is both a necessary condition for the occurrence of that event and it
reflects a change or aberration from the conditions that would have
been present under normal circumstances.344 Conduct that causes
injury may be described either as an act or an omission.345 As Hart
and Honoré have noted, “if there is a legal duty to do an act, and the
subject has not done it, the legally relevant description will be in
terms of an omission to perform the act in question.”346 The same
framework can be applied to the ethical obligations held by
researchers, sponsors, and institutions. In general, researchers have a
positive ethical obligation to provide the ethically justified standard of
care treatment to their research subjects.347 As noted above, this
principle is softened when there are good reasons to believe that it is
necessary to use either a placebo control or the local standard of care
in order to produce a valid and valuable scientific result.348 When the
conditions for a permissible deviation from the best available standard
of care are met, failure to provide the best available standard of care
should not constitute a research related injury.
Under this framework, the local de facto standard of care provides
a sharp lower boundary for the inclusion of failure to provide
standard care in the definition of a compensable research related
injury. Even if the control arm may permissibly use something less
than the local standard of care (e.g., a placebo), research participants
who choose to forego the (higher) local de facto standard of care in
order to participate in the clinical trial and suffer an injury because of
that decision may causally attribute that injury to the failure to
provide appropriate medical care that would otherwise have been
available.349 Under this framework, the failure to provide the de facto
344. See supra Part III.A.
345. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 138.
346. Id. at 139.
347. See, e.g., Wendler et al., supra note 339, at 927. See also BEAUCHAMP &
CHILDRESS, supra note 151, at 153.
348. See Wendler et al., supra note 339, at 927.
349. It is an open question at this point whether the de facto local standard
of care or the de jure local standard of care is the most appropriate
baseline measure. The important point to be made, however, remains
the same: failure to provide care where there is an obligation to provide
that care may be counted as a cause of an injury that flows from the
lack of care and would not have occurred in its absence. See, e.g.,
London, supra note 337. See also BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note
151, at 153.
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local standard of care is the cause (by omission) of any ill effects that
would not have occurred but for the decision of the participant to
forego standard of care treatment.350
A duty to pay compensation for injuries due to failure to provide
the ethically appropriate (as opposed to the local de facto) standard
of care is supported by the principle of nonmaleficence and its
requirement of risk minimization.351 Nonmaleficence requires research
sponsors, institutions, and researchers to “strive to minimize,
consistent with the scientific aims of their research, the risks and
burdens their experimental procedures impose.”352 Part of the
obligation of risk minimization is the requirement that the study
intervention be tested against the best available standard of care
unless there are ethically and scientifically valid reasons for downward
deviation.353 An injury caused by the failure to provide the
appropriate standard of care is one caused by an omission in the
presence of a duty.354 It should therefore be considered a compensable
research related injury.
As Hart and Honoré have noted, “[a] legal system may mark more
or less strongly and in various ways the distinction between the limits
on liability imposed by principles of causation and those imposed by
special principles of policy.”355 As a matter of public policy, many
countries may have valid reasons to limit compensable injuries due to
failure to provide the standard of care to those where the local de
facto standard of care has not been provided. This policy is supported
by the principle of compensatory and distributive justice because it
rewards the choice to participate in research and the decision, implicit
in that choice, to forego standard of care treatment in the
community.356 It is this choice that produces societal benefit in the
form of medical progress.357 A decision to participate in research is
valuable because results, whether or not they support the use of the
studied intervention, provide medical knowledge that is useful for
future experimentation.358 It is ethically desirable, then, to distribute
the burdens of research related injury as broadly as the benefits. In
350. See HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 138 (defining a cause by
omission).
351. See supra Part II.
352. See Joffe & Miller, supra note 21, at 36.
353. See Wendler et al., supra note 339, at 927.
354. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 139.
355. Id.
356. See supra Part II.
357. Id.
358. Henry et al., supra note 115, at 7.
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this way, what might be an unbearable burden for one person is a
relatively light burden when spread more broadly.
The precise nexus of causation with the standard of care,
therefore, depends on a number of factors: (1) the care that would be
available to participants outside of the research setting; (2) the
standard of care that researchers are ethically obligated to provide;
(3) the justification supporting the compensation requirement; and (4)
in light of the preceding three factors, was the injury caused by the
failure to provide a particular standard of care when that same
standard of care was owed? The standard of care that is owed will
vary depending on the precise conditions in which a clinical trial is
situated, but it is important to make clear that the procedure for
distinguishing compensable research related injuries from injuries
incident to provision of medical care can be applied in a uniform
manner.359
B. Type

The second element of a well-regulated injury is that of type.
Type refers to the distinction between medical360 injuries and other
types of intangible harm. Intangible harms have been recognized as an
important subset of risks to which research participants may be
exposed.361 The Declaration of Helsinki requires that researchers
recognize and guard against risks to the “life, health, dignity,
integrity, right to self-determination, privacy, and confidentiality of
personal information of research subjects.”362 The Belmont Report’s
requirement that ethical research have “respect for persons” may also
support recognition of some types of intangible harm.363 Others have
argued that such intangible harms might include:
[N]ot only emotional distress, but also lost opportunity costs,
destruction of trust and confidence in the research process,
clinical trial abandonment, affront to dignitary interests, breach
of confidentiality, invasion of privacy, loss of meaningful choice
about use of one’s body as an experimental object, participation
359. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 26, cmt. n
(2010). Lost Opportunity or Lost Chance as Harm may provide some
valuable insight into the evaluation of damages where it is difficult to
determine what the research participant’s precise medical course would
have been if the research participant had either opted not to enroll in
research or been randomized differently.
360. Documented mental health injuries (such as the onset of post-traumatic
stress disorder) requiring further medical treatment should be considered
“tangible” injuries for purposes of compensation.
361. See Saver, supra note 173, at 941,
362. WMA DECLARATION OF HELSINKI, supra note 35.
363. Saver, supra note 173, at 952.
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in a study that fails to disseminate trial data in order to
advance medical knowledge, and frustrated access to perceived
cutting-edge therapy.364

The question presented is, therefore, whether both tangible and
intangible injuries should be compensated in light of the ethical
principles that justify the creation of a compensation requirement.
The principle of nonmaleficence is implemented through the
requirement for risk minimization. Risk minimization is not without
its limits, and may be constrained by considerations of cost,
participant autonomy, and scientific integrity.365 In particular,
researchers’ duty to minimize risks is constrained by the ability to
accurately predict the harms that might arise as a consequence of a
particular clinical trial. This should include the elimination of
foreseeable intangible harms such as dignitary harms flowing from the
failure to obtain fully informed consent. A duty to minimize dignitary
and intangible harms does not necessarily imply that those harms
should also be compensable.
Intangible harms that do not flow from some form of wrongful
conduct are likely to be unforeseeable and difficult to prove within
any compensation framework. For example, Brazil’s regulations on
research related injury allow for compensation in cases of spiritual
injury.366 What will be found to be injurious to the spirit is, by its
nature, a deeply subjective inquiry that is not easily predictable
without an in-depth screening of potential research participants’
spiritual beliefs. Nonmaleficence therefore provides weak justification
for the provision of compensation as a remedy for these types of
harms. In addition to the weak normative justification, it is unclear
that compensation would provide an appropriate remedy for the type
of harm suffered in these cases because there are often no economic
damages. In the absence of wrongdoing, punitive damages are
inappropriate.
Compensatory and distributive justice, by contrast, seek to
reward the decision of individuals to participate in research rather
than seek standard of care treatment. It may therefore be the case
that distributive and compensatory justice require compensation for
all injuries caused by the decision to participate in research without
regard to type.367 This may be limited in application, however,
364. Id. at 946.
365. See Joffe & Miller, supra note 21, at 36.
366. See NAT’L HEALTH COUNCIL, ON RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS,
Res. No. 196/96 (1987).
367. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, supra note 27, at
II-2 (stating that “[h]uman subjects who suffer physical ~ psychological~
or social injury in the course of research conducted or supported by the
PHS should be compensated . . . .”).
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because of practical problems of proof with respect to intangible
harms in the absence of clear evidence of wrongdoing.368 In particular,
claims of intangible harm are not subject to objective proof, and they
are not of the sort where the monetary cost of compensation could be
easily predicted.369
Compensation systems in other countries and the tort framework
in the United States have dealt with this type of uncertainty by
requiring that an intangible harm be paired with a physical injury or
proximity to a physical injury in order to be compensable.370 It may
be reasonable to define a certain subset of intangible harms that are
particularly likely to flow from research participation as opposed to
clinical care and to limit compensation to those defined circumstances
in order to mitigate problems with burdens of proof.371
Finally, reparative justice aims to compensate an individual for all
harms flowing from the wrongful conduct of another. Many of the
most salient intangible harms are those that stem from some form of
wrongful conduct such as the failure to ensure informed consent or
abuse of the power imbalance inherent in the investigator-subject
relationship.372 Reparative justice seeks to put the harmed individual
in as good a position as if the wrong in question had never happened.
The principle of reparative justice therefore counsels that all types of
injury should be compensable, subject to some of the same possible
limitations on proof that arise in the context of distributive and
compensatory justice. In cases like these, an alternative remedy may
be appropriate such as nominal compensation and recognition of the
harm done.373
In light of the foregoing discussion, the principles requiring
compensation may support inclusion of intangible harms, but
368. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding
that a physician seeking informed consent “cannot know with complete
exactitude what the patient would consider important to his decision,
but on the basis of his medical training and experience he can sense how
the average, reasonable patient expectably would react.”).
369. Indeed, many no-fault compensation systems in the United States have
awarded a flat sum for intangible harms, such as pain and suffering,
because the difficulty of trying to evaluate individual circumstances
would have threatened to overwhelm the claims process. See, e.g.,
KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHO GETS WHAT: FAIR COMPENSATION AFTER
TRAGEDY AND FINANCIAL UPHEAVAL 104 (2012).
370. See, e.g., New Zealand Accident Compensation Act 2001, SR 49/2001.
See also Saver, supra note 173, at 948.
371. See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 369, at 104 (describing Hokie Memorial
Fund Plan, which based compensation for pain and suffering on length
of hospital stay, rather than an individual analysis).
372. See Saver, supra note 361, at 990.
373. See id. at 999.
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practical and evidentiary concerns may justify limiting the universe of
compensable injuries to only those where there is medical harm. Often
care for the medical harms that may result from a research injury
might mitigate intangible harms such as feelings of abandonment
which could otherwise have flowed from the same event.374 In such
cases, treatment and compensation for physical injuries is sufficient to
ameliorate any harm done. Where there is an intangible harm that is
attendant to a physical harm, additional compensation may be
appropriate. And where there is an intangible harm stemming from
wrongful conduct, some form of redress is appropriate, although
compensation may not be the best remedy for the harm done.375
C. Degree

Degree (or “magnitude”) of harm refers to the severity of the
injury suffered. When analyzing risks, researchers, and IRBs are well
advised to consider what procedures or interventions would be used in
standard of care treatment, and to exclude those from the calculation
of the risk that the research poses.376 Similarly, when determining
what degree of harm should be considered compensable, the level of
risk inherent in the research project and the level of discomfort
associated with standard care should be considered.377 In agreeing to
enroll in a trial, research participants consent to some degree of
discomfort that is inevitable even if everything goes as planned.378
Degree can be used to separate those injuries where treatment is
sufficient to fulfill the duty owed to the research subject from those
injuries where financial compensation is also warranted.
Nonmaleficence does not require that research be risk-free; rather,
it merely requires that risks be minimized consistent with the
scientific aims of the study.379 Requiring monetary compensation for
all injuries, regardless of degree, would overstate the obligation owed
374. See id. at 1002.
375. Richard Saver has suggested a number of remedies, including a judicial
forum akin to that provided for civil rights litigation. See id. at 992.
376. Id. at 955-956.
377. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, supra note 27, at II-2
(stating that research injuries should be compensated if “[t]he injury on
balance exceeds that reasonably associated with such illness from which
the subject may be suffering, as well as with treatment usually
associated with such illness at the time the subject began participation
in the research.”).
378. For example, participants in a malaria vaccine challenge study should
know (if consent was properly informed) that they might get malaria.
See generally 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2009) (setting forth requirements for
informed consent).
379. Joffe & Miller, supra note 21, at 36.
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on the part of the research enterprise.380 Other protections, such as
IRB review and informed consent, ensure that participants are aware
of the burdens of research participation, and participants may be
compensated for those burdens in the form of payment for
participation or provision of ancillary medical care.381
Many of the small harms that may be associated with ordinary
clinical care, such as bruising at the site of a blood draw or a mild
infection, may not warrant compensation because the injury itself
either will resolve spontaneously or will be cured with treatment
alone. For such small harms, treatment sufficiently minimizes the risk
of future harm and cures the harm already done to the subject
without the need for compensation. There is no need for financial
compensation in these cases because it is unnecessary to make the
subject whole.382
Distributive justice, which is based on the sharing of the benefits
and burdens of research, also requires treatment (but not
compensation) in these cases where the injury is slight, because the
burden is so light that the subject alone is expected to bear it without
the need to distribute the burden any further. An analysis under
reparative justice reaches the same conclusion because, where the
harm is small, treatment is all that is necessary to repair the harm
done. These three justifications for compensation reach the same
result in the case of small harms because the subject has not suffered
an injury that compensation is necessary to cure—proper medical care
is sufficient. Of course, if the required medical treatment is billed to
the participant, compensation may be owed to cover the cost of care.
For injuries that persist,383 are severe, disabling, or cause death,
compensation may be required because medical treatment alone does
not cure the injury caused. This is the case where the injury has some
enduring effect that, as a consequence leads to ongoing medical or
economic harm, such as the cost of future medical care, diminished
earning capacity, or lost wages.384 In those cases, nonmaleficence
provides a justification for compensation because there is a substantial
risk of further medical and financial harm to the subject if some form
of compensation is not provided.385 These types of financial risks
stemming from a serious injury are foreseeable and should be guarded
380. See id.
381. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2009); see also Grady, supra note 205, at
1686.
382. If the subject is compensated for his time and inconvenience, such small
harms may also be accounted for in the amount of that payment.
383. Meaning they require ongoing care or result in lasting impairment.
384. Henry et al., supra note 115, at 4.
385. See supra Part II.
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against as part of the initial risk minimization requirements before a
study may go forward.386 Distributive justice requires compensation in
these cases because the cost of a severe injury, including medical care
and lost wages, may be more than one individual can bear, but is
relatively light when spread across all of the beneficiaries of
biomedical research.387 Compensatory justice also requires
compensation for this type of harm because it was incurred due to
participation in a socially beneficial activity.388 Finally, reparative
justice counsels in favor of compensation in cases of severe injury or
death because treatment alone will not make the injured party
whole.389 The loss in the case of a severe injury or death is greater
than the physical loss and it must be treated accordingly.
In light of the moral justifications for providing compensation for
research related injuries, it may be permissible to limit compensation
to those injuries where treatment alone is insufficient to repair the
damage that has been done. It is reasonable for a compensation
system, therefore, to limit recovery to cases of serious injury,
disability, or death.
D. Remedy

Determination of an appropriate remedy provides the ability to
tailor the compensation provided to the injury suffered.390 There are
two broad categories of remedy that are applicable in the research
injury context: treatment and compensation. As discussed briefly
above, prompt treatment of research injuries is required by the
principle of nonmaleficence because the failure to provide treatment
creates a grave risk of future harm. Prompt treatment is relatively
uncontroversial as a remedy and is provided by many institutions
that do not otherwise provide compensation for research related
injuries.391
386. See supra Part II. See also ASS’N FOR THE BRIT. PHARM. INDUS. ET AL.,
INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION IN THE EVENT OF INJURY IN PHASE I
CLINICAL
TRIALS
(June
2012)
http://www.abpi.org.uk/ourwork/library/guidelines/Pages/clinical-trials-insurance.aspx. See also
Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations, 2004, S.I.
2004/1031, art. 3, ¶ 15(5)(i) (U.K.) (providing for damages in the case
of severe or disabling injuries).
387. See supra Part II.
388. See supra Part II.
389. See supra Part II.
390. See generally FEINBERG, supra note 369 (discussing the development of
no-fault remedies in light of the reasons for the creation of various nofault compensation programs).
391. See Resnik et al., supra note 37, at 6; see also LEWIN GROUP,
CARE/COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES IN CLINICAL RESEARCH (Feb. 3,
2005) (on file with the author).
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Remedy is both the product of the preceding three elements
(cause, type, and degree) and a policy judgment rooted in the
justifications for the provision of compensation. In calculating what
remedy is appropriate, it is necessary to ask whether there are any
complications in the chain of causation present at the time of the
injury that might provide a reason for downward deviation in the
amount of compensation paid.392 Furthermore, the type and degree of
injury will influence the amount of compensation that is required.
Monetary remedies can be broken down broadly into two types:
economic and non-economic. Economic remedies are those that
compensate for actual economic harms, such as lost wages, costs of
care, or loss of future earning potential. Non-economic remedies,
however, compensate for intangible harms such as pain and suffering.
The different bases for compensation lead to different conclusions
with respect to economic and non-economic remedies.
1. Economic Remedies

Both the principle of nonmaleficence and the principles of
distributive and compensatory justice support the provision of
economic remedies. Financial harm flowing from medical harm is a
foreseeable risk subject to mitigation and thus creates a duty in
nonmaleficence.393 Financial harm that would not have occurred but
for the subject’s decision to participate in biomedical research is
subject to compensation under the theory of distributive or
compensatory justice.394 The tort doctrine of strict accountability
aligns with the bioethical principle of nonmaleficence and provides
some support for the allocation of economic damages to injured
research subjects. In its longer form, strict accountability is phrased
as “strict accountability for harms within the scope of risks distinctive
to an actor’s conduct or activity.”395 It reflects a judgment “that an
actor, even though not at fault, should be liable for harms and risks
distinctive to the actor’s conduct or activity.”396 This principle is
particularly informative in the case of research related injuries, where
there is a strong normative reason to reallocate the risk of injury from
the party on which it falls (the injured research subject), to another
appropriate actor. In this case, the principles of nonmaleficence and
distributive and compensatory justice suggest that the cost of injury
392. See HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 180 (detailing how abnormal
circumstances that are present at the time of the injury, rather than
being incorporated in to the causal framework, are instead taken into
account when determining what damages are owed).
393. See supra Part II.
394. See supra Part II.
395. KEETON ET AL., supra note 260, at 609.
396. Id.
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should be reallocated to sponsors, institutions, researchers, and the
public generally. This reallocation of costs is in part possible because
the conduct of the duty bearers is socially valuable and will “survive
in the marketplace even at the higher price that includes the cost of
compensating for harms done.”397 It also limits compensation to
injuries arising from conduct that is “within the risk” of the socially
beneficial activity.398 This forces decision makers to ask whether the
type of harm that occurred is of the sort that the policy allocating
risk was designed to accommodate. For example, an injury due to an
adverse reaction to an investigational drug is within the risks of
biomedical research, while a road accident on the way to the clinic
arguably may be excluded.399
Distributive and compensatory justice, by contrast, are better
aligned with a variation on the “welfare principle” of tort remedies.
The welfare principle spreads the costs of socially beneficial conduct
so that society, rather than the entity that caused the harm, bears
some degree of the cost of the injury caused.400 The aim of the welfare
principle is not complete repair of the harm done, but rather the
maintenance of a certain baseline standard of economic welfare.401
This principle counsels that the aim of public compensation for the
incidental harms of socially beneficial conduct should not necessarily
aim to make the injured party “whole,” but rather, it should ensure
that he or she is not further injured or left below a socially acceptable
baseline.402 This principle can be seen at work in countries that choose
to incorporate research related injuries into a broader medical
compensation scheme, such as Sweden and New Zealand.403 In those
countries, all medical injuries are generally compensable, but
compensation is pegged at a capped percentage of the individual’s
actual economic losses. Because care is provided through national
health systems, the economic losses consist of lost wages and lost
future capacity.404
Both nonmaleficence and distributive or compensatory justice
counsel that careful attention should be paid to the underlying
397. Id. at 610.
398. See supra Part III.A.
399. See HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 80. It should be noted that in
the case of a road accident there is also another, more proximate, duty
bearer in the form of the negligent driver.
400. KEETON ET AL., supra note 260, at 612.
401. Id.
402. See id.
403. See supra Part I (discussing Sweden and New Zealand’s compensation
systems).
404. See supra Part I.
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condition of the subject and the type and degree of the injury in
determining what economic damages are owed. The goal of economic
damages in this context is not to put the subject in the best position
possible, but rather to mitigate the financial risks of research
participation and to ensure that the participant is no worse off than if
he or she had decided to forego research participation and instead
seek standard of care treatment. Alternatively, compensation may be
used to ensure a baseline level of economic welfare. Analysis of
causation will, therefore, have some influence on the remedy that is
appropriate because reduction in the amount of any payment may be
justified when the participant’s underlying condition or some other
additional cause contributed to the participant’s morbidity or
mortality.405 Type of injury also affects the determination of the
appropriate remedy because, as mentioned above, some types of
injury are not likely to be cured by monetary compensation.406
Similarly, degree of injury is an important consideration because more
severe injuries will require a greater degree of compensation in order
to place the subject in as good a position as he would have been in
had he decided to forego research participation.
In order to take all of the appropriate factors into account, a
number of countries rely on their statutory frameworks for
determination of damages in personal injury (tort) cases to set the
amount of compensation owed in medical injury cases.407 Factors
considered may include the severity of the trial participant’s
underlying illness, the type of injury suffered, lost wages, and lost
earning capacity.408 Reliance on the tort framework has been
controversial in some cases because it may eliminate damages where
the patient-participant is already severely ill and therefore does not
have economic damages, but nonetheless has suffered a significant
injury.409 Calculation of economic remedies based on a tort measure of
damages also risks treating participants differently based on their
income.410 Higher-income research participants would receive more in
compensation than lower-income participants who suffered the same
405. See HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 180.
406. See supra Part III.B.
407. HELLBACHER ET AL, supra note 80; Biskmark & Paterson, supra note 46,
at 280; Kuroyanagi, supra note 68.
408. See Henry et al., supra note 115, at 23-24.
409. Kuroyanagi, supra note 68. For example, if a participant in a phase one
oncology trial is so ill that the participant is unable to work before
beginning participation in the trial, and the trial intervention both fails
to help the participant’s cancer and also causes significant deterioration
in the participant’s quality of life, then the participant will have suffered
harm but will not have an economic harm.
410. See Henry et al., supra note 115, at 24-25.
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injury. A system based on tort damages would therefore fail to treat
like patients alike.411 Such an arrangement may provide an incentive
for researchers and institutions to select participants of low
socioeconomic status. Allocation of economic remedies should take
account of the likelihood of out-of-pocket costs of medical care to the
participant, including future care, lost wages, and any disability or
diminished earning capacity. Both long-term and short-term disability
benefits should be available. Amounts should be tied to a uniform
national standard that adequately compensates individuals for their
contribution but also treats like participants alike.412
2. Non-Economic Remedies

The principle of reparative justice provides the best fit with a
requirement to provide non-economic remedies. Non-economic
remedies compensate for intangible harms, such as pain and suffering,
and are appropriate when the harm suffered is the result of some form
of wrongdoing.413 Nonmaleficence and distributive and compensatory
justice provide inadequate support for a requirement to pay noneconomic remedies because in those cases wrongdoing is not at the
root of the obligation to pay compensation.414 Requiring the provision
of non-economic remedies in the absence of wrongdoing risks deterring
the conduct of socially beneficial research activities and might also
present unworkable administrative difficulties.
In the case of reparative justice, however, punitive damages may
be appropriate both as a deterrent to future wrongdoing and to
acknowledge responsibility for the harm that was caused.415 The “fault

411. Id. at 4.
412. Id. at 24. Such a standard should not be a set amount, but should be
pegged to a measure that will rise with inflation such as the GS scale.
See also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, DIV. OF COAL MINE WORKER’S COMP.,
BLACK LUNG MONTHLY BENEFIT RATES FOR 2014 (setting the benefit for
all coal miners disabled by black lung disease at “37.5% of the base
salary of a Federal employee at level GS-2, Step 1”) available at
http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dcmwc/regs/compliance/blbene.htm
(last
visited Oct. 20. 2014). See also 20 CFR § 726.203(c)(4) (2014); 30
U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (2012). Determination of the amount at issue is an
appropriate activity for notice and comment rulemaking under the
Administrative Procedure Act.
413. See supra Part III.B (discussing types of injuries covered and the
relationship of type to the justifications supporting compensation).
414. See supra Part II.
415. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 944 (“The utility of this
punitive element in damages is twofold. It may have emotional value to
the plaintiff, a matter of special significance in those cases in which the
wrong is essentially an injury to the plaintiff’s sentimental interests, as
in personal defamation or interference with domestic relations. At the
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principle” flowing from reparative justice has been succinctly
summarized as, “[w]hen blameworthy conduct causes harm to others,
the blameworthy actor ought, in general, to compensate for those
harms.”416 An individual who wrongfully causes harm to another has
an obligation to repair the full extent of the damage—in whatever
form it may be—and non-economic remedies are appropriate when
their application is necessary to make the harmed individual whole.
Additional monetary penalties may be appropriate as a deterrent
against future bad behavior. As stated above, these cases should be
handled through the tort law framework and not through a no fault
compensation system.417
E. Application

A morally justified compensation framework should be based on
principles of nonmaleficence and justice and should take into account
all four elements of a well-regulated injury. Within these boundaries,
there is considerable flexibility with respect to policy design. Practical
implementation concerns such as burdens of proof must be thought
through when deciding among potential systems of compensation and
determining what type of system might be appropriate. In light of the
difficulty of proving causation, especially in clinical trials involving
patient-subjects, a preponderance of the evidence standard is
appropriate.418 A no-fault compensation system would cover all
injuries that were more likely than not caused by research.419 This
standard should be interpreted leniently in favor of the research
participant because the sponsor or institution is likely to have more
expertise in the matter and better access to the evidence.420
Two systems seem to be the most justifiable in light of both the
reasons supporting compensation and the four elements of a
compensable research injury. One would be based on a mandatory
insurance or self-insurance/indemnity requirement for research
sponsors and institutions, and the other would be an administrative
specialty court. Each has different strengths and weaknesses and
aligns differently with the various relevant considerations.
An insurance or indemnity system is both justifiable and
feasible.421 It has the benefit of allowing cost sharing between the
same time, the punishment inherent in the remedy will have a more or
less deterrent effect upon the defendant.”).
416. KEETON ET AL., supra note 260, at 608.
417. Henry et al., supra note 115, at 7.
418. Id. at 10-11.
419. See id. at 3.
420. Id. at 10-11.
421. See generally id.
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research enterprise, which holds the strongest duty in nonmaleficence,
and the general public whose broader obligation is based in
distributive and compensatory justice. Sponsors or institutions would
be required to purchase insurance coverage proportionate to the risk
burden of the institution’s research profile.422 This insurance would be
used to cover all compensable research related injuries on a no-fault
basis.423 The cost of insurance or self-insurance could feasibly be
passed on to consumers of medical products to allow for broader
distribution of the burdens.424
If administered by an outside insurer, this approach would be
rule-based because determinations with respect to the appropriateness
of compensation would be made by an insurer relying on a standard
definition of “research related injury.” An insurance-based plan is
thus less flexible in application than an administrative approach. It
also has the drawback of being more opaque with respect to its
reasoning regarding whether or not an injury is compensable, and as
such raises some procedural justice concerns. Finally, insurance may
be subject to conflicts of interest because the insurer has an incentive
to deny claims in order to maintain a better profit margin.
A variation on the insurance model would be to place the locus of
responsibility on research institutions rather than research sponsors.
This would account for the wide variation in types of funding for and
goals of research. Institutions would have the ability to self insure by
setting aside a fund for compensation of research injuries that is
commensurate with the risk profile of the research that it conducts.425
Institutions would also be able to arrange for other duty bearers to
contribute to the self-insurance plan. For example, an institution
would be able to work out an arrangement for a for-profit company to
purchase commercial insurance for their clinical trial, but would be
able to either self-insure or otherwise provide assurance that
participants in not-for-profit or government sponsored research would
be compensated. The institution also has less of a conflict of interest
with respect to research subject compensation because it is likely to
reap reputational and scientific benefits if subjects feel that the
institution is well regulated and accountable.426
Placing the locus of responsibility on the institution also has the
advantage of working in tandem with existing adverse event reporting
422. See id. at 8.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 8 (explaining that many pharmaceutical companies incorporate
funds set aside for compensation purposes into their research spending).
425. See id.
426. See London, supra note 337, at 933-34; see also U.S. PRESIDENTIAL
COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 16, at 61-62.

379

Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015
Defining Compensable Injury in Biomedical Research

systems and allowing for greater procedural transparency.427 Under
such a system, either an investigator or a participant could report a
suspected research related injury to an institutional administrator.428
The administrator would seek evidence from both parties and make
an initial determination as to whether an injury was research
related.429 All decisions would be made based on a preponderance of
the evidence and the standard would be interpreted in favor of the
injured subject.430 An institutional insurance/indemnity plan should
provide uniform compensation for medical costs, long- and short-term
disability, and a death benefit.431 Such payments ought to be based on
a national measure that does not vary based on the participant’s
income or the institution where the research is conducted.432 Such an
approach might be more palatable to some institutions than the
current practice many undertake of simply settling lawsuits from
injured participants before they go to trial.433
An administrative court system, by contrast, would place more of
the burden on the general public, but could receive some of its
funding from the research industry. Such an approach would account
for the different ethical obligations held by different stakeholders in
the research enterprise. It would have the benefit of being able to
apply a standard-based casuistic approach through an expert decision
maker. This approach could lead to more predictable and less opaque
decision-making that is more readily subject to oversight. In such a
system, it may be beneficial to place the burden of proof on the
researchers and their sponsors and institutions because those parties
are the most likely to have access to the evidence. If the compensation
framework is divorced from any type of malpractice or accountability
proceedings, requiring researchers to furnish evidence pertaining to a
particular participant’s care may be easier and will provide the best
chance of getting a factual determination of the causes of the injury.434
It is unlikely, however, that such an approach will be politically
427. Henry et al., supra note 115, at 22-23.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id. See, e.g., GENERAL MOTORS IGNITION COMPENSATION CLAIMS
RESOLUTION FACILITY, GENERAL MOTORS IGNITION COMPENSATION FUND
PROTOCOL
(June
30,
2014)
http://www.gmignitioncompensation.com/docs/FINAL%20PROTOCOL
%20June%2030%20%202014.pdf.
431. Henry et al., supra note 115, at 24-25.
432. Id.
433. A waiver should be required for individuals who choose to accept the
payment. See id. at 26.
434. See, e.g., Kachalia et al., supra note 113, at 400.
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feasible given the lack of will to put any compensation system in place
over the past several decades.435 An administrative court system
divorced from the institution also raises serious concerns about the
burden on research participants436 and about the equitable sharing of
the cost of research injuries.
In light of all of the relevant considerations, an institution-based
self-insurance approach combined with a similar requirement for
sponsors of research is both the best compensation system and the
one that is most likely to be implemented.437 An institution-based selfinsurance/indemnity approach places the burden of compensation on
those in the best position to foresee and minimize risks. It also allows
for cost sharing between institutions, sponsors and the public to the
extent that costs of funding the compensation system are built into
either the cost of care at the institution or the cost of the products
produced.438 Furthermore, an institution based insurance/selfinsurance requirement is easily compatible with other systems of
compensation around the world. This is a consideration of particular
importance in light of the amount of international research conducted
by sponsors within the United States.
This type of practice already has support at some institutions
within the United States and would require less political and
regulatory change to implement than the creation of a specialized
court or public compensation fund.439 It also has the benefit of
enabling a less burdensome administrative claims process and
minimizing bureaucracy thus allowing for efficiency in getting
financial compensation to those who need it.440

Conclusion
At the heart of an ethically justifiable compensation system is a
succinct and appropriate definition of what constitutes a compensable
research related injury. That definition should contain the four
regulatory elements of causation, type, degree, and remedy. In short,
435. See, e.g., Henry, supra note 13, at 412; see also Alan J. Weisbard, The
Role of Philosophers in the Public Policy Process: A View from the
President’s Commission, 97 ETHICS 776, 779-82 (1987).
436. See Genevieve M. Grant et al., Relationship Between Stressfulness of
Claiming for Injury Compensation and Long-term Recovery, 71(4)
JAMA PSYCHIATRY 446, 446 (2014).
437. See Henry et al., supra note 115, at 14.
438. See supra Part II.
439. See Henry et al., supra note 115 at 11, 27.
440. See id. at 5. See also Grant et al., supra note 436, at 446 (noting that a
more stressful claiming process is associated with a longer recovery
time).
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a compensable injury is a medical injury, caused by the subject’s
research participation, and is of such a degree that medical treatment
alone is insufficient to remedy the harm caused. By using this
definition as a starting point, it is possible that, in spite of forty years
of inaction, the research community may begin to move toward a
comprehensive no-fault approach to compensation of research related
injuries. In doing so, the research community in the United States
would not only join the ranks of most other countries engaged in
significant biomedical research, but would also fulfill a long-neglected
ethical obligation.
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